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THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

(OKH Project # 7)

by

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OUTLINE

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## PART ONE

### THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

#### CHAPTER 1

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

From 1870 to 1916 the position of "Quartermaster General"<sup>1</sup> was a very comprehensive one, within which responsibility for Army supply constituted only a part. With the appointment of General Ludendorf as the first Chief of Army Supply and Administration, the great change occurred that reduced his functions to tasks of supply only.

The strength and compositions of the General Staff of the Army High Command during the war, 1870-1871, were as follows:

a. Strength:

Sixteen officers, seven senior officials, one junior official, four non-commissioned officers, fifty-nine enlisted men, ninety-three horses, and twelve vehicles.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter the present title Chief of Army Supply and Administration will be used in place of the historic Quartermaster General (Generalquartiermeister).

## b. Composition:

Subordinate to the Chief of the Army General Staff were: two adjutants, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, three branches, and the Commandant of the Army High Command.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration was the deputy of the Chief of the Army General Staff. His function and position may be compared, according to present-day concepts, to that of a Chief of Staff.

At St. Avold on 12 August 1870, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration ordered that all officers of the General Staff of the Army High Command Headquarters were to assemble in the office daily at 7.30 a.m. and at 6.00 p.m. and, on marching days, one hour after arrival at the new quarters. The officers' tour of duty went from noon to noon.

On 3 December 1870 the Chief of Army Supply and Administration issued an order that all telegrams, reports, and letters, had to be delivered to him first. He then decided what to show to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

Out of experience the office of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration grew a relationship which visualized him as a relief to the Chief of the Army General Staff. The former became the first and most important assistant of the Chief of the Army General Staff. Selection must, therefore,

fall upon a man with whom the Chief feels himself closely connected and who is equipped with a sufficiently wide range of view for large-scale operations and at the same time is conversant with all details required in warfare and has had the necessary practice in mastering them.

The Chief of Supply and Administration's initial task in activating his organization is the preparation of a complete Standard Operating Procedure. A general outline of this procedure can and should be created in peacetime. Nevertheless, the assignment of officers slated to head the various divisions within the High Command may occasionally have to be modified in the early phases of development to meet exigencies arising during the organization of all the divisions within the High Command. The same applies even more to the matter of establishing working procedure. Initially the Chief of Supply and Administration must see to it that his operating procedure functions smoothly and efficiently throughout the campaign, that his oral reports meet the requirements of the constantly changing situation, and finally that everything of importance has received due consideration. He would do well to keep at his disposal an officer of the General Staff to maintain liaison with other divisions within the High Command. He did well to retain a general staff officer at his disposal to

fall upon a man with whom the Chief feels himself closely connected and who is equipped with a sufficiently wide range of view for large-scale operations and at the same time is conversant with all details required in warfare and has had the necessary practice in mastering them.

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maintain relations with the various branches of the Army High Command Headquarters.

What has been mentioned so far as relief functions of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration toward the Chief of the General Staff on the whole only concerned more trivial matters. Of particular importance, however, was the fact that the latter also undertook the relief of entire branches of service, notably of everything relative to the communications zone, relations with the War Ministry, timely drawing of siege material, rehabilitation of forces, reorganization, change of non-mobile occupation troops to mobile state, use for purposes of the Field Army occupation troops which were no longer necessary, directives of the Chief of Telegraph Communications. In all these instances the Chief of Army Supply and Administration had to make his own decisions in all secondary matters, upon completion of tasks in this category he notified the Chief of the General Staff in so far as it was necessary for the latter to know of it. In more important matters he first had to obtain a decision from the Chief.

These developments acquired through experience in the years up to the turn of the last century were published in appropriate service regulations.

In the "Outline for the Performance of Duties with the Army General Staff" published in 1891, the post of Chief of Army Supply and Administration was described:

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration<sup>2</sup> stands in a similar relation to the Chief of the Army General Staff as the chief of staff of an army corps to the commanding general. He is destined to keep the chief of the Army General Staff free for the conduct of operations and to assume the bulk of other duties for him. The Chief of Army Supply and Administration will open the incoming letters, submit the most important to the Chief of the General Staff, and send the others as well as those coming back from the Chief of the General Staff to the appropriate branches. Incoming mail which concerns operations specifically will be immediately delivered to the branches. Oral reports will first be made to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration who will handle the less important matters himself.

In the service regulations for the year 1894 some changes had been made.

.....He (the Chief of Army Supply and Administration) acts as deputy to the Chief of the General Staff and relieves him as far as possible of all details. All duties with the General Staff of the Army High Command Headquarters are subject to his immediate direction and supervision. He will regularly attend the oral reports to the Chief of the General Staff to His Majesty, the Emperor. The oral reports of the branches will first be made to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, who will handle himself all those matters concerning internal duties, order of the day, administrative matters, and so forth. All questions concerning operations or otherwise important matters will be reported to the Chief of the General Staff by the proper branch chief in the presence of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.....

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<sup>2</sup>The reader is reminded that the original title of the office was the Quartermaster General.

From the year 1897 on, the "Service Regulations for the Army General Staff of the Army High Command Headquarters" applied. An extract follows:

1. The Chief of the Army General Staff conducts the entire war operations according to orders issued to him by His Majesty, the Emperor.

2. The Chief of Army Supply and Administration stands in a similar relation to the Chief of the General Staff as the chief of staff of an army corps to the commanding general. He acts as deputy to the Chief of the General Staff and relieves him as far as possible of all secondary matters. All duties with the General Staff in the Army High Command Headquarters are subject to his immediate direction and supervision.

The oral reports of the branches will first be made to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, who will personally handle all matters concerning internal duties, orders of the day, administrative matters, and so forth. All questions concerning operations or other important matters will be reported to the Chief of the General Staff by the proper branch chief in the presence of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration will open all incoming papers and refer them to the First Branch with the exception of the important and urgent items, which will immediately go to the Chief of the General Staff. In his presence the incoming mail will be opened by the Chief of the First Branch.....

On 24 October 1900, conferences concerning a fundamental revamping of the War Communications Zone Order commenced. Count Schlieffen directed that a draft be prepared and began tentative conferences with the War Minister (von Gossler).

Conferences on the draft stretched over years and were subject to greatly divergent tides of opinion. For the post and the sphere of duties of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration this development was of importance.

Certain concepts held at that time are worthy of note.

A commentary by Ludendorf, dated 30 November 1909 at that time with the Second Branch of the Army High Command General Staff, reads:

"The Regulations of the Communications Zone in Wartime needs complete revision. The draft drawn up by the War Minister is in no way sufficient. The Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime should actually have been the basis of all special regulations related to it. Owing to its late revision this has not been practicable. I feel that the Regulations should not only contain the responsibilities and the management of the communications zone in general and the organization and function of all rear area agencies as did the one hitherto in use, but it must show clearly the manner in which the responsibilities charged to the communications zone are to be fulfilled.

A special paragraph should, therefore, be incorporated indicating the manner in which the supply of manpower and Army needs of all kind will proceed and how the Army will be relieved of all that hampers its striking power. The regulation must thus give a general view for rear area agencies as well as for armies, corps, and divisions, of the manner in which all matters concerning supply will be handled, but without going into details which are contained in special regulations. The general viewpoints and directives of the latter must, however, be incorporated in the Regulation.

The position of the Inspector General of the Communications Zone, who as an agent of the Chief of the Army General Staff has to direct all duties uniformly on the rear lines of communications, must

remain secure and firm. Endeavors of individual agents to reduce his authority must therefore be countered. This does not preclude an increase of independence within their administrative districts.

The regulation was once again revised, this time by the General Staff. Experience gathered on administrative general staff trips in the following years was also utilized.

A commentary of the War Ministry (von Heeringen), dated 2 March 1913, read:

Before the War Ministry can pronounce a final opinion on the draft of the Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime prepared at our headquarters, the reasons either for or against the assignment of the entire Army supply to an Inspector General, must be thoroughly debated.

In the conferences to date between representatives of the General Staff and the War Ministry no agreement has been reached on this question. In order to bring about a decision at the earliest possible time another conference appears advisable to me, in which binding resolutions may be arrived at. In view of the fundamental significance of the matter it will be necessary to submit these resolutions subsequently in the presence of the Military Cabinet to the Supreme Authority for decision.

The different conceptions of the General Staff and the War Minister concerning the position of Chief of Army Supply and Administration thus became a military cabinet question. The commentary of the General Staff, laid down in a letter to the War Minister, dated 29 April 1913, has apparently been lost. But its content may be gathered from the answer, which the War Minister gave on 15 June 1913:

The new draft of the Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime had been made available to the agencies of the War Ministry.

Independently the fundamental question will meanwhile have to be cleared as to how the supreme direction of Army supply should be organized. The new form of the regulations has not removed my objections against this part of the draft either.

Basically only the designation of the Chief of Army Supply has been changed: henceforth he is to be called "Quartermaster General" but otherwise is to be equipped with the same authority proposed for the "Inspector General of Army Supply" in the first draft. The more such central agencies with extensive powers there are in the field, the greater frictions--those of a personal kind not excluded--must be feared. If the "Quartermaster General" is made superior to the General-intendant<sup>3</sup>, the choice of persons to occupy these two posts will be limited to quite a small circle. This can be all the less desirable as the right appointments to these two positions are by no means easy anyway. At any event, the Chief of the Army General Staff has reserved to him the power of decision with regard to Army supply for occasional questions of fundamental significance and wide-reaching consequences. His complete dissociation from all administrative matters is neither desirable nor practicable. On the other hand I recognize that as great as possible relief from the details of Army supply should be effected and fixed for him by the Regulations. Both factors can best be combined by the attachment of a special Chief of Army Supply to the Chief of the Army General Staff. He would have to direct Army supply affairs generally on his own following objectives familiar to him and special directives from the Chief of the Army General Staff, further authority being possibly delegated to him to this end from time to time by the latter. Orders by the Chief of Army Supply would have to be issued, unless decisive authority be vested in him directly by the Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime under an appropriate title such as "Chief of the Army General Staff--The Chief of Army Supply." Responsibility for the decisions of the Chief

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<sup>3</sup>Civilian official in administrative services, ranking as brigadier general.

of Army Supply in all important cases would remain with the Chief of the Army General Staff.

The chiefs of the various branches of Army supply would have to comply with the directives and decisions of the Chief of Army Supply in so far as they concern supply.....

The Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime appeared in a new printing on 12 March 1914. The concepts of the General Staff were fixed in it. The position of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and his sphere of duties were basically laid down. Experience at the beginning of the war 1914-18 proved the regulations to be right and practicable.

These excerpts from the Regulations are of historical significance.

Par. 3, Sec 3: For the directives concerned here (supply and use of all requirements of the Army) a Chief of Army Supply will be assigned to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

Par. 4: The Chief of Army Supply and Administration (with the rank of a commanding general) will be continuously informed of the intentions of the Army High Command. He will direct and supervise Army Supply in its entirety in accordance with the directives of the Chief of the Army General Staff. By taking measures with a view to the future he will work toward maintaining the striking power of the Field Army as the principal and decisive viewpoint for action on all sectors of Army supply.

His functions, however, will be limited to the issuance of general directives leaving full freedom to independent action of the top agencies within the various field of Army supply. Where several field touch, overlap, or supplement one another he will endeavor to remove frictions.

Par.5: If separate chiefs of supply are employed for certain theaters the Army High Command will define the boundaries of their respective authorities.

Par.6: The following are assigned to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration who also has a staff under a chief of staff:

- a. The Chief of Field Ammunition.
- b. The Generalintendant of the Field Army.
- c. The Chief of Field Medical Service.
- d. The Chief of Field Railroads.
- e. The Chief of Field Telegraph Communications.
- f. The Field Chief Postmaster.

He will issue directives to the rear-area inspectors of the armies, who, however, will primarily be assigned to army headquarters.

Par.7: The Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the agencies listed under Par. 6a to f are under the jurisdiction of the Army High Command Headquarters.

Par.27: Influence of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration upon the communications zone extend to the following obligations in addition to general directives to army headquarters:

- a. Definition of the lateral and, if necessary, the rear boundaries of the communications zone, its distribution to the various armies, and allocation of communications.
- b. Suggestions whether parts of the communications zone should be converted into governor generalships.
- c. Mediation in the arrangement of authorities when the communications zone wholly or partly falls to the area of governor generalship or of the zone of the interior.
- d. Balancing of communications zone units, personnel, and material stocks between armies.

e. General directives on restoration of damaged bridges and construction of new traffic routes.

f. Overall management of evacuations of prisoners of war.

g. Decision on publication of Army mail surveys by the Reich Post Office.

Upon mobilization the strength for the Army High Command Headquarters was established at fifty-seven officers and upper-level officials, one hundred sixty-one noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, ninety-four rear area soldiers, eighty-nine riding horses, sixteen automobiles, three buses, and eight trucks. Since 1870-71 the strength of officers had increased two-and-a-half, that of non-commissioned officers and enlisted men fourfold.

Upon appointment of Generalleutnant von Stein as Chief of Army Supply and Administration upon mobilization in 1914 the service regulations for the Chief of Army Supply and Administration in the war-prepared assignment distribution plan read as follows:

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration is the first assistant to the Chief of the Army General Staff and simultaneously his deputy. He will relieve him to the greatest possible extent of all matters of secondary importance. The branch chiefs will make their oral reports first to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration who will himself handle all affairs concerning internal duties, orders of the day, and administrative

matters. The Chief of Army Supply and Administration will sign as follows:

For the Chief of the Army General Staff

.....

All questions concerning operations or other important matters will be reported to the Chief of the Army General Staff by the appropriate branch chief in the presence of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

Furthermore the Chief of Army Supply and Administration will direct the entire Army supply according to directives from the Chief of the Army General Staff with the aid of his staff and the agencies assigned to him.

The Army supply includes the following: ammunition, food, field medical service, field railroads, field telegraph communications, army postal service, and service in the communications zone.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration will be authorized to issue directives to the rear-area inspectors of the armies, who, however, will primarily be subordinate to the army headquarters.

All further detailed information on function and authority of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the agencies under his command with respect to Army supply is contained in the Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime.

Upon the appointment of Generalleutnant Ludendorff on 29 August 1916 as Senior Chief of Army Supply and Administration, only the order determining his rank appeared. Limitation of his authority and responsibilities seems to have been settled orally between the Emperor, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and General Ludendorff.

Generalleutnant Ludendorff, Chief of the General Staff East, is promoted to the rank of General der Infanterie and is appointed Senior Chief of

Army Supply and Administration with the salary of a commanding general of a corps.

Army High Command Headquarters, August 29, 1916

/signed/ Wilhelm

It is certain, however, that the previous Chief of Army Supply and Administration had been limited to his functions of Army supply.

On 11 October 1916, the "Staff Organization Chart of Chief of the Army Supply and Administration of the Army High Command Headquarters" was issued (Chart 1).

On 24 March 1917, another assignment distribution plan followed, and in keeping with the immensely increased jurisdiction, there was one more in June. By the end of the war, assignment plans had been changed and augmented several more times. The last available table of organization of the Staff of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, dated 8 October 1918, is to be found in Chart 2.

During World War I from 1914-18, organizational changes in accordance with expanding conditions occurred, but the basic principles with respect to Army supply did not alter.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration and his chief of staff were dropped from the service on January 17, 1919. The elements of army supply and administration headquarters remaining in the Army High Command Headquarters,

the representatives of the Generalintendant, the Inspectorate of Motor Transportation, and the Chief of the Field Medical Service were attached to the Chief of the Army General Staff, in so far as their work was concerned.

After World War I all matters of army supply were handled by the Sixth Branch of the Army High Command. Army Regulation No. 90 (Supply of Field Army) was prepared on the basis of the Regulations for the Communications Zone in Wartime and of experience gathered in World War I and in view of the conditions of modern warfare. It was chiefly the work of the then chief of the Sixth Branch, who became subsequently chief of staff of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration at the beginning of World War II, and who held the post of Chief of Army Supply and Administration himself from the fall of 1940 to July 1944.

In the course of World War II this basic regulation came to need supplementation and alteration as a result of practical experience. Its revision was accomplished in the late fall of 1944. The draft of this new regulation, ready for printing in January 1945, contained the sum total of knowledge taught by five war years. One copy is still in existence: it was never published in view of the approaching end of the war.

The post of Chief of Army Supply and Administration was established at the beginning of World War II. Composed of the peacetime Sixth Branch of the Army General Staff, its establishment had been prepared in accordance with the mobilization schedule. It assembled for the first time on the evening of 25 August 1939, upon the commencement of mobilization in Camp Zeppelin at Zossen near Berlin.

The Sixth Branch of the General Staff with "supply" as an assignment (Chart # 3) had been until the fall of 1938 combined with the Fifth Branch, assignment transportation, under the Assistant Chief of Staff III. According to the service regulations, however, the branches were completely independent in their work and had the right to report directly to the Chief of the Army General Staff and in special cases also to the Commander in Chief of the Army, from whom they, in turn, received the directives for their work.

The Assistant Chief of Staff III took no part in the daily routine work, he was only informed of it. Instead he handled individual tasks which were specially assigned to him by the Chief of the Army General Staff. These tasks involved the study of problems, which were not connected

with the assignments of the Fifth and Sixth Branches, such as provision of divisions, corps and armies with ammunition as well as requirements of the supply trains, road repair, movement of large motorized units, regulation of traffic, and revision of Part II of the regulation on leadership of troops.

In the autumn of 1938 upon a reorganization of the Army General Staff, both the Sixth and the Fifth Branches were assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff I (Operations) under whom those branches of the General Staff in charge of the conduct of operations were combined; the First Branch, Operations, was already under his command. This condition continued until the end of August, 1939. Upon the commencement of mobilization on 25 August 1939, the Sixth Branch was withdrawn from the Assistant Chief of Staff I, who became the deputy to the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Sixth Branch was converted into the independent post of Chief of Army Supply and Administration in the Army General Staff.

The new Chief of Army Supply and Administration, appointed in August 1939, was then commander of the Kriegsakademie<sup>4</sup>, which was closed at the beginning of mobilization.

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<sup>4</sup>Equivalent to the Command and General Staff School.

Owing to his preoccupation with urgent projects at the school, he had assumed this position only in May 1939, and he was unable to familiarize himself with the new assignment. Hence, to guarantee a smooth transition as well as continuity, the former chief of the Sixth Branch, who had held the post for years and was fully conversant with the assignments of the Branch, was appointed as chief of staff of the new agency.

This peculiar personnel situation caused the chief of staff to be delegated extraordinary powers by the Army Commander in Chief and the Chief of the Army General Staff; he had the right to report directly to them, receive direct orders and sign himself with due authority. "For the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and for the Chief of the Army General Staff."

## CHAPTER 2

MISSION OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND  
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1939 TO 1945

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration directed and supervised the supply of the Field Army. He was assigned to the Chief of the Army General Staff, worked according to his directives and orders, and was responsible to him for the execution of all measures guaranteeing the supply of the Field Army. Basic directives and orders were generally signed by the Chief of the General Staff or the Army Commander in Chief, the others by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration "By Order of the Chief of the Army General Staff." The Chief of Army Supply and Administration had the same rank as a commanding general of a division.

In general it was his job to supply the Field Army with all the material which it needed to accomplish its missions and to free it of everything limiting its freedom

of operation and movement. In addition he was in charge of the extensive field of repair of weapons, equipment, and vehicles of all kinds. He ascertained the supply requirements of the Field Army for long periods and initiated appropriate requests.

His responsibilities in detail, as well as those of the chiefs of the various supply branches, were fixed in the Army Regulation No. 90 (Parts I and II) entitled "Supply of the Field Army." Some additions or shifts to other agencies were included during the course of the war but basic changes did not occur.

Distribution of assignments and organization of the various fields of work appear from the staff organization charts, compiled to show the organization as of the beginning of the war in 1939 (Chart # 4), as of summer 1941 (Chart # 5), spring 1943 (Chart # 6 and 7), and 1945 (Chart # 8), and demonstrate the changes resulting from experience. Such amendments had their cause in the complexity and peculiarities of the theaters of operations and, especially during the Russian campaign, in the endeavor to insure the supply for large-scale operations.

In the following the salient points at issue are listed in chronological succession:

a. Campaign in Poland and France: Supply of the Field Army, war administration, questions of military law including legal counsel and penal affairs.

b. After the French campaign: Disassociation from the field of "legal affairs;" dissolution of the post of chief of staff with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

c. From the beginning of 1941 to the end of the war:

(1) Expansion of the sections into branches headed by branch chiefs (spring 1941).

(2) Establishment of a "chief section" under a younger general staff officer to relieve the Chief of Army Supply and Administration of technical general staff work (1941). The post was dissolved again in the fall of 1944 and a major was placed on the staff to perform similar duties.

(3) Creation of the concept of supply service (Branch I) in contrast to material replacements (Branch III) (summer 1942).

(4) General of Technical Troops was attached to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration (1941).

(5) The office of Army Ordnance Inspector was created and attached to the Chief of Army Supply and

Administration in order to have an agency that concerned itself in detail with all ordnance matters in the Field Army, especially with the repair of weapons and equipment.

(6) Ammunition and fuel supply were taken over by Branch I as operational means (1943).

(7) Owing to increasing shortage of major supply goods and the need for centralization the Planning Branch was transferred from the Organization Branch to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration (Branch III).

(8) In the winter of 1944/45 the handling of military police matters passed from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration to the Operations Branch for the alleged reason that traditionally these matters from army groups down to divisions were handled by the operations branches.

(9) Ground operations in the home theater made the establishment of a field economic branch appear necessary to avoid overlapping with civilian agencies. The practical work was never accomplished by this branch. It remained a paper organization (1944).

(10) A close union of the General of Motor Transportation Troops with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was established by making the chief of Branch III

(material replacements) simultaneously chief of staff of the Chief of Motor Transportation Service (1944).

In the course of the war the main effort of the entire field shifted more and more to Branches I and III. Branch II (War Administration) no longer had a mission by July 1944. Its responsibilities were assumed directly by the Chief of Wehrmacht High Command. Yet in order to supply information and answer inquiries it remained in existence in substantially reduced size until the beginning of 1945.

There was no uniform control and direction of the over-all supply of the Wehrmacht. The Replacement Army, Luftwaffe, Navy, Reich Labor Service, Waffen-SS, Organisation Todt, had all their own supply institutions and channels. They also had their own organizations, for instance, Chief of Luftwaffe Supply and Administration, and Chief of Naval Supply.

Although in supplementation of Army Regulation # 90, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was placed in charge of the various fields (such as food, quarters, finances, ammunition for army weapons, fuel, PX items) of supply to all units committed in the area of operations of the Army, overlapping, nonetheless, constituted the rule. With an increasing shortage of ammunition and fuel, the supply

service in general, as well as partly in individual items, was severely hampered if not occasionally made impossible by this state of affairs.

## CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY  
SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

Army supply was a means for the conduct of operations. It was a servant and never an end in itself. The power source of the home front was linked by it to the power output at the front. The vital currents of war industry and of operations were combined in its circulatory system.

Operations were conditioned by many factors.

At first, the deliberations of the operational staff did not take army supply into account. Creative thoughts were not shackled at the hour of birth by concessions to this field.

After a tentative decision had been formed, the army supply service was assigned its responsibilities and missions, which were to insure the material basis and to examine and determine how supply was to be carried out until the termination of operations. The end result formed the basis for a final decision.

The limitations of German armament capacity compared with that of other nations and the most varied consequences of the military-geographic and military-politic situation of Germany, frequently imposed such ways and modes of work on the German army supply system as to make a virtue of necessity. Hence the aim was to achieve the greatest possible effect with small means, to insure availability of the operational requirements after a scrupulously accurate calculation, and yet to meet the vicissitudes of war and changes of situation by having reserves constantly at hand.

A comparison between a rich and a poor man most easily explains the process. The rich man is in a position to ask the question, "What can I do with my wealth?" or "How rich must I become to reach a specific aim with absolute---say 200 percent---certainty?"

The poor man must ask himself, "How can I save my life and how can I ward off destruction regardless of my poverty? Unfortunately, I have no time left for security, I will be killed first."

The close interrelation of operations and supply, primarily in the course of operations, formed the keystone for the homogeneous system of German army supply. The inevitable result of this fact was that the direction and

conduct of army supply had to lie in the hands of General Staff officers. Added to this was the fact that the size and the complexity of the field required officers with particular organizational abilities trained to work on the basis of an operational pattern and to think ahead. This, however, did not preclude field unit and reserve officers from being employed if their training background, their interest, and their personal abilities seemed to offer a guarantee for a successful performance.

#### I. SUPERIOR AGENCIES

Until the establishment of separate jurisdictions over theaters for the chief of the Army General Staff and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration received his orders and directives solely from the Chief of the Army General Staff or the Commander in Chief. Thereafter he received them from both. Yet the assignment of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration to the Chief of the General Staff was not altered. With respect to his duties, however, a condition had been created which will receive special treatment below in Section II.

##### 1. Chief of the Army General Staff

a. Operations: The Chief of the Army General Staff informed the Chief of Army Supply and Administration

of all operational intentions early enough so that supply preparations could be made. Details on execution were agreed upon and determined between the Chief of the Operations Branch and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. After the Chief of Army Supply and Administration had calculated the basic figures for his sphere of authority, he addressed his requests concerning railroad transportation to the Chief of Transportation. Capacities and limitations as well as decisive factors in one field or another were discussed by the Operations Branch, Chief of Army Supply and Administration, and the Transportation Chief, and the final result was reported to the Chief of the Army General Staff. The more difficult the situation was, the shorter supplies became and the more strained transportation conditions grew, the more necessary was the constant, guiding hand of the Chief of the Army General Staff. After a decision had been made, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration began to work. He reported to the Chief of the Army General Staff the time of the beginning of preparations and the termination date as well as the amount of materiel available, how long they would presumably last, the organization established, and the planned direction of supplies.

At the same time the Chief of Army Supply and Administration pointed out potential difficulties and ways to remedy them. This manner of working proceeded like clock-work, with no outwardly perceptible friction. It was thorough and active, skilled and objective to a high degree, clearly pointing out the possible and the impossible, and, hence, sober and honest. When the Head of State amateurishly took it upon himself to direct operations and tactics in an increasing degree without these basic preparations, an unmilitary manner of procedure began which was alien and repugnant to general staff work. One can certainly hold a different opinion regarding an operation and the tactics to be used with respect to execution of a project as long as one does not wholly violate elementary principles, but to persist in this view against the naked facts, such as the Chief of Army Supply and Administration presents, is impossible. To shut one's eyes to the facts is just as foolish as to step to a ticket office with only enough money to cover half the fare. No other opinion comes into question. The contents of a cash-box has to be taken at its face value. Wishful thinking was foreign to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and he would never have dared to present such an unsubstantiated report to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

b. Daily Discussion of the Situation. During the daily discussion of the situation at the office of the Chief of the Army General Staff the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was oriented on the development of the situation, the intentions of the army groups or armies, and of all other details, knowledge of which was necessary for his job. He on his part described the supply situation, reported changes, pointed out existing or impending difficulties, and had an opportunity to request decisions in urgent and important general supply matters. He also received orders and directives based on the development of the situation.

c. Oral Report to the Chief of the General Staff. On matters of fundamental significance, such as might influence combat or particular operations, which arose in the performance of his duties, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration reported to the Chief of the Army General Staff privately. Such reports generally were made two or three times a week. Conferences by telephone were held several times a day.

At intervals individual special branch heads, such as a Generalintendant, representatives of the Army Medical and Veterinary Departments at OKH, Officer in Charge of Ammunition and Fuel, Chief of Material Branch, reported to

the Chief of the General Staff on their jobs either alone or in the presence of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The Chief of the Army General Staff decided which items should be brought to the attention of or submitted for decision to Commander in Chief of the Army.

2. Chief, Wehrmacht Operations Staff. After the division of operational responsibilities for theaters, supply was also handled by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration for the theater of the Wehrmacht High Command. But this in no way gave him Wehrmacht authority. Neither his assignment to the Chief of the Army General Staff nor his place of work was altered for he remained at Army headquarters. Yet he now received orders from two agencies. Thus supplies had to be divided according to double requisitions. Vocal force and emphasis behind this division varied depending on the persons in question. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command should have acted as a balancing and deciding agency. This, in fact, did not occur and decisions were generally left <sup>to</sup> of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The relationship between the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was very loose and influenced by the general atmosphere between the Army High Command and the Chief of

the Wehrmacht High Command. As long as there was no major fighting in the Wehrmacht High Command theaters, friction did not have any great effect upon the Eastern theater. That immense quantity of valuable supplies up to amounts sufficient for a year were stocked or were to be stocked in the theaters of the Wehrmacht High Command as reserves is another matter.

Cooperation in general staff fashion between Chief of Army Supply and Administration and Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff could not be said to have existed. The cause was not mutual antipathy but an organizational error. The top-level military organization and its Chief of Operations Staff, charged with the conduct of operations in the Wehrmacht High Command theaters, had moved onto the plane of a second Army General Staff.

Not until the beginning of the invasion did the Wehrmacht Operations Staff try to avail itself of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration for the management of supply. The loose connection between the two agencies resulted in intermittent and inadequate information reaching the Chief of Army Supply and Administration on operational intentions. What had not grown organically could not bear fruit in decisive days. Attempts of individual men of discernment of direct  
to

matters into reasonable channels, were not lacking, but it was much too late for a successful solution.

The organizational deficiencies could not be offset by the Supply and Administration Branch of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In accordance with its mission of informing the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the supply situation prevailing in the three branches of the Wehrmacht and of suggesting ways to balance this supply, the Army Supply and Administration Branch was staffed by too few personnel. Its position and its mission can be compared with those of the supply and administration section of an army group in 1942. It could not perform the function of supply management. Neither the authority of this Branch nor the appropriate person in the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command were available for imposing control upon the chiefs of supply and administration of the branches of the Wehrmacht, (Army, Navy, Luftwaffe). Only the fuel sector was handled directly in the Supply and Administration Branch of the Wehrmacht High Command under the Chief of Wehrmacht High Command. It is only owing to this fact that there was any fuel at all in 1944 for tactical movements. For full treatment of this subject the reader is referred to the study on "The German High Command" and the simultaneously prepared "History of

the Wehrmacht High Command." Experience has shown that such a branch in charge of supply might be able to function as a liaison organ between the agencies, as was done in practice, but that it could not additionally perform Wehrmacht jobs. Occasional exchanges of views with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration established the differences which existed, but no more. Only with respect to the provision of reserve stocks of occupied countries belonging to the theaters of the Wehrmacht High Command did the Chief of Army Supply and Administration receive directives from the Wehrmacht Operations Staff through the Wehrmacht Supply and Administration Branch. Such directives generally were concerned only with purpose for which the stocks would be used and the amount of stocks.

## II. EQUAL-LEVEL AGENCIES

All those branches of the Army General Staff and other agencies with whom the Chief of Army Supply and Administration had chiefly to cooperate are shown in Chart # 10. This cooperation was accomplished in person, by telephone, or in writing. With an increasing shortage of supplies, the problems of coordination grew, and, by the end of the war, assumed dimensions impossible to overcome.

### III. OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE STAFF OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

The various branches worked independently according to orders and directives from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration insofar as routine matters were concerned. All fundamental issues were decided by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration himself unless a decision had to be obtained from the Chief of the Army General Staff.

The General Staff Branches I, II, and III were the supporting columns, which in turn cooperated with the other branches of the staff. The working procedure, as such, did not change during the war, not even as a result of the abolition of the post of chief of staff whose place was taken by three branch chiefs. The personal work load of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was, of course, increased. Generally the agencies of the staff communicated orally with one another. Drafts for orders and the like were sent of all agencies concerned for examination. Branch I was responsible for handling supply orders for operations with the other branches and special sections contributing.

The majority of outside tasks were performed by telephone. In order to be able to make priority calls on the overloaded telephone network, the Chief of Army Supply and

Administration was authorized to make "operational speed calls," the branch chiefs and certain specified section chiefs "exceptional calls." Similarly their teletype messages could be marked with the priority marks "KR" and "SSD."

Discussions were held very frequently, often with large numbers of people attending. This was easy with the agencies of the Army General Staff, since they were located relatively close together. For visits to field command posts, airplanes were usually sufficiently available.

When the staff of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was located outside the Zossen Camp there was a convenient connection by special train to Berlin. Frequent use was made of this due to the necessity for close operation with the agencies in the zone of the interior.

In the morning, the daily reports, which had arrived, during the night, from army group and army assistant chiefs of staff were submitted to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The Chief of Branch I (Supply Management) added other telephone reports and an evaluation of the daily reports. After returning from the morning situation report at the Chief of the Army General Staff's office, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration oriented the branch chiefs

and other necessary technical officers on new developments and at the same time issued his orders and directives. The day was fully occupied for him with reports from the chiefs, section chiefs, technical officers, with conferences with other branches of the General Staff and agencies, and with telephone calls to the Assistant Chiefs of Staff. The branch chiefs and the independent section chiefs worked in the same manner. In the evening, the branch chiefs IV, IVb, IVc, were informed of the daily situation at the front and simultaneously received the necessary directives concerning supply. During the night, the assistant chiefs of staff of the army groups personally reported on the special aspects of their supply situation to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration by telephone, stated their most urgent requirements, and had the opportunity for an exchange of views with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. Insofar as the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was in a position to make decisions directly, he did so at this occasion, otherwise he notified them the next day. These evening and night conversations were immediately passed to the branches so that by the next morning orders based on them were issued. Thus an especially live and safe connection to the front was created and was never broken.

throughout the war owing to the excellent communication network and to the fact that telephone contacts took place during the night when the lines were generally free. No supply train, for instance, ran from the zone of the interior to the front whose approximate location at any time the Chief of Army Supply and Administration did not know. Major surprises could not occur without the Chief of Army Supply and Administration having been informed. This control entailed great efforts--work except on Sundays and holidays, ran from 0900 hours until 0200 or 0300 hours the next day with a break of one hour and a half at noon--and required a voluminous staff working with painful accuracy. It furthermore presupposed good relations with the front agencies. As often as his work permitted, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration visited the assistant chiefs of staff of army groups and armies and the latter frequently came to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration's headquarters.

#### IV. REPORTS AND CHANNELS

The activities of the Chief of Supply and Administration paralleled the structure of the army supply system and its detailed organization. Activities were based upon orders, directives, and instructions from top to bottom-levels and upon reports from bottom to top-levels.

The subordinate agencies reported on the supply situation either in periodic reports or, in particularly important or urgent cases, in special teletyped reports. Periodic reports were the daily reports of army groups and armies and the written monthly reports on the supply situation. In addition there were periodic reports on all sectors of supply (Chart # 17-# 37) and reports specially ordered.

Channels for all kinds of orders and reports were standardized in such a manner that, for instance, the daily reports contained almost nothing but figures in a definite order and according to a definite code. The supply and administration section of a division could evaluate these equally as well as the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

Analogous staff organizations of the subordinate supply and administrative posts and their occupation by general staff officers with similar training were the reasons behind the smooth functioning of supply operations. The assignments of the various supply and administration posts were shown below, as they actually were.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The information is, without exception, given from memory. Deviation from manuals is therefore probable.

By issuing directives for supply the Chief of Army Supply and Administration insured a uniform management of Army supply and guaranteed the execution of special measures arising from the situation.

Channel: from Chief of Army Supply and Administration down

(Chart # 9)

- a. Poland and France Campaigns to the armies (directly to assistant chief of staff)
- b. Russian Campaign (until October 1942) either through field agencies of Chief of Army Supply and Administration or directly to armies (assistant chiefs of staff) and army groups (supply and administration branches)
- c. Russian Campaign (after October 1942) to army groups (assistant chiefs of staff) directly to forwarding authority and directly to armies (assistant chiefs of staff)
- d. Wehrmacht High Command Theaters to command headquarters (assistant chiefs of staff)
- e. The Chief of Army Supply and Administration exercised influence on the Wehrmacht High Command theaters with respect to supply by designating the Supply and Administration Branches of a few army groups as field agencies of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration at the same time.

## P A R T T W O

ORGANIZATION, DUTIES, AND OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE  
SUPPLY BRANCHES OF FIELD ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Agencies within field army headquarters in charge of the management of supply were:

1. The field agency of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration from the beginning of the Russian campaign in 1941 to the fall of 1942 within the area of the army groups.
2. The Supply and Administration Branch of the Army Groups (from 1942)
3. The Supply and Administration Branches of the Armies
4. The Supply and Administration Branches of the Army Corps and the Commanders of the Army Rear Areas
5. The Supply and Administration Sections of Divisions.

For channels of supply see Charts # 17-# 37. For special projects (Norway and England) specially composed field agencies of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration or supply and administration staffs under the direction of assistant chiefs of staff were employed. Until 1942 a supply

and administration section was assigned to the army groups whose responsibilities will be described in a separate section.

## CHAPTER 4

THE FIELD AGENCIES OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY  
AND ADMINISTRATION

## I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF FIELD AGENCIES

During the Campaigns in Poland and France the army group headquarters had no active part in the direction and management of supply. The army headquarters were linked directly to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration with respect to reports, requisitions, and allocations of supply. This procedure proved efficient in the campaign against Poland in view of the limited width and depth of the theater and the limited number of armies committed. The same organization was envisaged for the campaign against France and was also employed but with a certain restriction.

After a breakthrough to the Channel, during the final battles in Flanders and Northern France and during the assembly for the offensive across the Somme and Aisne Rivers southwards, the supply lines of the railroads generally ended at the western German frontier and in Luxemburg owing

to demolitions on Dutch, Belgian, and French rail lines. Only a few lines with small capacities led farther westward, such as the line by way of Libramont. Only a few trains daily arrived on this line. Many trains were frequently derailed because the roadbed was heavily damaged. Yet several armies depended for supply upon those lines, which were, as far as remembered, the Second, Ninth, Twelfth, and part of the Fourth Armies. The supplies for these armies that could not be shipped on rail lines had to be fetched in truck convoys furnished by armies and divisions either from unloading yards in Luxemburg or from unloading yards and storage camps in the Reich. There was at first no rail line across the Meuse River.

In a similarly difficult position were the armies on the western flank which advanced partly through Holland and Belgium, such as the Panzergruppe<sup>1</sup> under von Kleist which reached the Channel through southern Belgium and Northern France.

In this strained situation the Chief of Army Supply and Administration decided to decentralize the previously uniform supply of the armies. He established two field agencies, one in the area of Charleville, the other in the

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<sup>1</sup>Armored force the size of an army but operating in conjunction with an army.

area of Spaa-Avesnes. Each of these field agencies was put in charge of supply troop units of various kinds headed by a single commander, but included no large transportation units. On railroads and in special convoys formed by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, the most important supplies were taken into the field agency and unloaded in camps established and managed by the supply troops. Primarily ammunition and fuel were involved. The armies depended upon the field agencies addressed their requisitions to them and picked up the allotted supplies with their convoys at the depots of the field agencies.

A little later, about the end of May 1940, this organization was further expanded by the institution of Supply and Administration Officer, Brussels. This agency was in charge of transportation units speedily assembled in Holland and Belgium. It furnished the depots of the field agencies with supplies, partly with those that were fetched as described above from unloading yards and storage dumps in Germany and partly with those that stemmed from captured material in the occupied areas, Holland and Belgium.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration delegated to Supply and Administration Officer, Brussels had the right to decide the extent to which the two field agencies were to

participate in the distribution of the supplies on hand. Thus the Supply and Administration Officer, Brussels determined the amount of the allocations to the army groups (A and B), while the field agencies determined the allocations to the armies within the army groups.

Certain essential advantages were gained from this procedure. One agency stood above the armies and allocated supplies. When all requisitions could not be filled, this agency could allocate the available supplies to those armies whose requirements were the most urgent according to their operational and supply situation.

The period of time from the dispatch of the requisition to the arrival of supplies at the army headquarters was substantially shortened and was fixed enough to be used for calculation in the future.

Previously upon requisition, supply trains, whose courses were extremely uncertain as to both time and destination, had been set in motion by the Army High Command. The allotted supplies could now be picked up directly in the field agencies depots. Although the distances to be covered by the army convoys were rather considerable, especially after the beginning of the pursuit battles south of the Somme and Aisne, the certainty of receiving the requisitioned items and issuing of them to the troops was increased.

When, in June 1940, fighting ceased upon the Armistice, the Spaa-Avesnes field agency began to move its depots into the area around Reims. When the troops, that is the armies advancing east of Paris, supplied from Reims reached and crossed the Loire River, the Supply and Administration Officer, Paris was being established.

## II. FIELD AGENCIES IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RUSSIA

When the planning for the campaign against Russia began, the agencies engaged were aware that the coming campaign would be essentially different from the preceding ones chiefly in the number of armies committed and in the dimensions, both width and depth, of the theater. The multitude of armies and the vastness of the area made it appear doubtful whether the Chief of Army Supply and Administration would always have the necessary communication with the armies.

The number of available motor trucks was limited: a distribution of them to the numerous armies would have meant dispersion. It was considered practical to place an agency within each army group in charge of this transportation. This agency could then furnish increased supplies to one or another army according to the requirements of the situation.

Moreover, it appeared precarious to dispatch the supplies required by the armies from the zone of interior. The vastness

of the area and the insecurity of the traffic situation necessarily made the period elapsing until arrival of the supplies an incalculable factor.

Large storage dumps for the armies could be established in the vicinity of the frontier. What would become, however, of that portion of their contents that was not used if the armies pushed forward in the event of a quick advance such as was the case in the campaigns in Poland and France. The armies had to be ridded of any anxiety concerning supply lines across the vast spaces in their rear. An army commander must know that there was behind him an organization that would relieve him of this anxiety and was close enough to him as to be able to calculate his needs.

These deliberations led to the conclusion that the Chief of Army Supply and Administration would not be in a position to obtain an overall picture in time to meet the requirements of the various armies, to weigh them against one another, and to furnish the required supplies in time. An agency for the direction of supply had to be interposed between the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the army headquarters.

It might have been a proper idea to make the army group headquarters an authoritative link in the supply

management. This idea was rejected, primarily because the old concept was upheld that the army group headquarters were purely tactical agencies and should not be encumbered with the logistical support of their armies. It appeared sufficient to keep the group headquarters informed of the supply condition of the armies under their command. In addition, this conjecture may have influenced the Chief of Army Supply and Administration that, since the assistant chiefs of staff assigned to army group headquarters were subject to a natural influence from their commanders, the influence of the Army High Command would be decreased in favor of a view merely from the standpoint of the army group.

The Chief of Army Supply and Administration, however, wished to reserve to himself freedom to exchange and shift both transportation and supplies according to the situation not only within each army group but also between the army groups. Actual cases occurred later on, in which supplies from the area of one army were liberally furnished to armies in the area of another, for instance, Field Agency North temporarily supplied the Ninth Army on the northern wing of Army Group Center. In the opinion of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration this freedom was necessarily

diminished by the appointment of assistant chiefs of staff at the headquarters of army groups. It seemed that the supply of several army groups was more safely guaranteed when it was directed by agencies over whom the Chief of Army Supply and Administration exercised an authority undiminished by other influences.

Thus, with each of the three army groups, envisaged for commitment in the east, an Army Supply and Administration Field Agency was created, which in conformity with the army groups bore the designations North, Center, and South.

### III. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF IN CHARGE OF AN ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION FIELD AGENCY (Chart # 11)

The mission of the various field agencies was the supply of the armies and immediately subordinate units of the army groups in whose area they were employed and, to a certain extent, units of the Luftwaffe, the Navy and Army auxiliaries. The command post was in charge of the direction of supply, while the supply district, the heavy truck transportation and the technical troops were agencies of the command post for the management of supply.

The field agencies provided the armies with all supplies needed for warfare, assumed the entire evacuation of the wounded, of diseased animals, and worn or damaged materiel, if men, animals, and materiel could not be rehabilitated within a short period of time in the area of the army. They also effected the operation and maintenance of existing plants for generation and distribution of electric power and gas and water works.

The field agencies were kept constantly informed on the supply condition of the armies. To this end, the army headquarters sent one copy of their daily report on the supply situation to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and another to the assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency and its technical officers in order that all levels could maintain constant contact with each other. On the basis of these reports and on special requisitions of the armies and other units and agencies that had to be supplied, the field agencies arranged the allocation of supplies or the removal of men and materiel subject to evacuation.

In order to fill the requirements of armies and lesser units independent of the arrival of supply trains, the field agencies had considerable stocks of all supplies on hand and had hospitals for men and animals and shops of various kinds

to accomodate everything that had to be evacuated. All these facilities constituted the supply district which was established by the commander of the supply district in accordance with directives from the command post.

Shipments falling within their sphere of responsibility were carried out by the field agencies. For this purpose the heavy truck transportation units were at their disposal. These units trucked supplies from the dumps of the supply district and from the railheads to the foremost bases of the supply district. An additional task of the field agencies was to relay directives from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration to the armies in a form appropriate to the area of the army group.

The tactical and operational data for the direction of supply was obtained by the assistant chief of staff in charge of a field agency from the chief of staff or the operations officer of the army group or in special cases from the commanding general. Similarly he was obliged to keep the chief of staff and the commanding general of the army groups constantly informed of the supply condition of the armies and of the supply situation prevailing at the field agency, the state of its stocks, and the potential development of the supply situation.

A knowledge of the operational and tactical situation and intentions of the army group and an awareness of the supply situation of the armies furnished the field agency with a basis for the supply and evacuation requests which it addressed to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. In case of need, supply troops and transportation could be requisitioned from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, and be returned when the field agency no longer required them.

The field agencies did not take part in the administration or economic exploitation of the occupied areas except for evaluation of actual captured materiel and the control of prisoners of war.

The responsibilities of the field agencies, which paralleled their relations to the army groups, was to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration to whom they were assigned. They were his intermediary organizations with the army groups. The field agencies received directives from him for supply management, allocations of supplies, and orders for evacuation of all kinds of items out of the area of the army group. They had to submit reports on the state of supply in the area under their charge and estimates on the supply situation and its future development. Whenever

necessary the Chief of Army Supply and Administration ordered the field agencies to supply other units not belonging to any given army group.

The field agencies did not belong to the army group headquarters, whose units they serviced by order of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. They were special units. Accordingly, the army group headquarters could dispatch requisitions to the field agencies but not orders relating to basic supply matters. If a field agency believed itself incapable of filling a requisition upon which the army group headquarters insisted, a decision from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration was obtained either by the chief of staff or commander in chief of the army group or by the assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency. The armies received basic orders from the field agencies concerning supply management. Such orders were signed by the assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency or in technical matters by one of his technical officers. When the necessity arose to issue orders relative to supply which could affect the fighting power of a unit, its readiness for use, the living standard of the troops, or the tactical situation, they had to bear the signature of the chief of staff of the army group.

With regard to supply management it was left to the discretion of the assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency whether he shipped the supplies allotted to the armies with his heavy truck transportation from the camps and pools of the supply district to the depots of the armies, had the armies fetched them in their own convoys, or sent them directly in the supply trains arriving from the zone of interior. Further distribution and further shipment was up to the army headquarters.

The assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency was authorized to give employment directives to the commander of the supply district, to the chief of heavy truck transportation, always a regimental commander of the supply troops, and to the commander of technical troops. The assistant chief of staff of the field agency indicated the particular areas in which supply sections and bases were to be established and determined the capacity which each individual base should have with respect to the number of supply trains to be unloaded daily and the type and quantity of supplies to be stocked. He assigned to the chief of heavy truck transportation daily transportation duties and he indicated to the commander of technical troops requirements for the employment of his troops in safeguarding gas, water,

and electricity. The assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency was authorized to assign temporarily elements of the supply troops, the heavy truck transportation, and the technical troops to the armies. Administratively, the commander of the supply district, the chief of heavy truck transportation, and the commander of technical troops were not attached to the field agency.

As already mentioned, the army group headquarters took no part in supply management. In the campaign in Poland and France, a second general staff officer (Supply and Administration) advised the Army High Command on the state of supply of the armies and the probable development of the supply situation according to information received from the assistant chiefs of staffs of the armies.

This second general staff officer remained with the army group headquarters after the institution of the field agencies, but his duties were shifted to the field agencies. In their place he assumed the management of prisoners of war to the extent that it became a responsibility of the army group. He directed the evacuation of prisoners of war from the armies to the army group and from there to the rear and insured the temporary accommodation and care for the prisoners in the rear areas until they were shipped away. For

the execution of these responsibilities a commander of prisoners of war was at his disposal.

The supply and administration officer also handled the commitment of headquarters units for the protection of the rear area, except when this prerogative belonged to the sphere of the commissariats and when such military responsibilities had been assumed by military administrative commanders. This situation would occur when a part of one army area was no longer an active operations zone. It was a duty of the supply and administration officer to suggest to the chief of staff of the army group when the state of operations permitted that a division of the operational area into an army area and rear army area be constituted.

#### IV. OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE FIELD AGENCIES

The armies assigned to an army group headquarters or the units directly attached to it addressed their combined requisitions for supplies to the command post of the field agency. Similarly, the totals of wounded and diseased animals and damages of equipment of all kinds were the subject of obligatory periodic reports, either daily or every few days.

On the basis of these reports and within the limits of available stocks, the command post assigned supplies to the

army headquarters, the Luftwaffe, and those units directly attached to the army group and indicated the base where these supplies were obtainable, whether the armies were to pick them up, or whether they would be shipped to them by the heavy truck transportation of the field agency. The command post also informed the army headquarters of the areas to which wounded or sick animals and unserviceable materiel could be evacuated. Collecting and distribution points for wounded personnel, transported with the aid of the heavy truck transportation and ambulances of the field agency, were also established. From these locations the wounded were dispatched to the hospitals of the supply district.

Simultaneously, upon the notification sent to the assistant chiefs of staffs of the armies, an order was given to the commander of the supply district for the issuance of the amounts allotted to each of the armies. As a rule this order also indicated the base in the supply district in which the supplies would be available and who would pick them up. Occasionally the command post delegated to the commander of the supply district authority for allocating directly to the armies certain kinds of supply, primarily food and clothing. In this case the requisitions of the armies were sent directly to the commander of the supply district.

Each allotment to the armies was marked with the same number by the army corps headquarters in order that the commander of the supply district, in the event of several allocations overlapping in time, would be always able to determine which requisitions had been filled and which were still outstanding.

When the evacuation of wounded or sick animals had been announced by the armies, the commander of the supply district also received orders to accomodate them in his installations. Accomodation facilities for equipment, weapons, and motor vehicles needing repair was, as a rule, not ordered in each specific case. In general there was a basic rule as to which maintenance facilities of the field agency the individual armies could use.

Also within the program of supply management, the chief of heavy truck transportation was given orders for those allocations that were to be shipped to the depots of the armies from those of the supply district. At the same time an order was issued indicating what was to be evacuated on return of the convoys unless there were standing orders for the utilization of returning transportation, such as the wounded, prisoners of war, or cartridge cases.

While supply and evacuation were accomplished for the armies in this way by the interplay of command post, supply district, and heavy truck transportation, the command post requisitioned new supplies from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and requested accommodations for the evacuated men, animals, and materiel. At first, supply proceeded according to requisitions, but later the average requirements of the army groups over a given period could be determined in advance.

Train lots of a certain composition were always requisitioned for five to ten days, the number depending upon the capacity of the railroad lines leading to the various army groups. It was the responsibility of the command post to indicate the destination and to supervise the arrival. The commander of the supply district was responsible for the unloading of the trains and the storage of goods at the bases.

In evacuation actions the destination for each individual train was often determined by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. But frequently certain industrial areas in the zone of interior were assigned to the army groups, for evacuation of a certain kind of materiel. For example, during the winter of 1941-1942, it developed that the motor

vehicles of the eastern forces were worn by the campaign to such an extent that the maintenance facilities of the armies and field agencies were unable to take care of the repairs. Hence, several Wehrkreise<sup>2</sup> in the Reich were put at the disposal of each army group for the evacuation of motors and motor vehicles. The field agencies apportioned these Wehrkreise to the armies and directed the rearward shipments to free spaces in the repair shops as indicated by the Wehrkreise.

Special measures were frequently required in the preparation for new operations. First, the reserve stocks of the armies involved in the operations were brought to an amount usually determined between the army group headquarters and the assistant chief of staff of the field agency. Then the forward bases of the supply district were provided with increased stocks, frequently by shipments of the contents of rear bases. The field agencies endeavored to use as many supply troops as possible out of forward bases, in the days immediately preceding the beginning of operations, but upon the start of the advance these troops were usually put at the disposal of the armies for

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<sup>2</sup>Wehrkreis-a basic military area in Germany, somewhat resembling the pre-war U.S. Corps Area.

the establishment of new supply bases, and still more frequently, they soon took over bases that previously had belonged to the armies in order to release the army supply troops.

Finally, and immediately before operations began, the heavy truck transportation vehicles were loaded with the most necessary supplies in order to either participate in the actual advance of armored and motorized units, to follow the advance of the armies and supply the troops by direct issue, or to deposit the cargo in newly established dumps far ahead. In most cases the second solution was chosen. It made possible the release of the heavy truck transportation irrespective of the rate of consumption by the troops. For the latter could take over the contents of the heavy truck transportation vehicles only when they had used up the loads on their own transportation. In awaiting this, the loaded heavy truck transportation might be taken to a point too far forward or remained inactive.

In either case, supply communication with the initial base was interrupted since the railroad line immediately behind the advancing troops could not yet be in operation, particularly in the east where gauge conversion was made, and the heavy truck transportation constituted the sole

means for mass shipments from the base to the attacking divisions. It was, therefore, more practical to unload early, let the trucks return, be refilled with supplies from the base, and again sent forward.

The composition of a load for a heavy truck transportation unit for such purpose (Handkoffer)<sup>3</sup> was a result of calculation and experience. The load was based on a regular consumption rate of fuel and food by the troops from the beginning of operations up to an anticipated time when the contents of the heavy truck transportation would then be available to the forward troops. Approximately a quarter of the tonnage consisted of ammunition and the remainder was fuel and food. Primarily artillery and tank ammunition was loaded. For example, suppose 9,850 tons of transportation were available. Of these, 4,650 tons will be for fuel, 3,300 tons for food, and 1,900 tons for ammunition.

Because of the large number of posts with which the field agencies had to cooperate in the performance of their duties, the distance between posts, and the wide distribution of its own organization, the Dnieper Supply District of the Field Agency Center covered 400 square kilometers in

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<sup>3</sup>German code name, English translation "suitcase."

October 1941. The field agencies were greatly dependent upon the technical means of communication such as telephone, teletype, and radio, supplemented by the employment of motorcycle, automobile, and airplane.

Since close cooperation with the units which the field agency served was necessary, the command post was located in the immediate vicinity of the army group headquarters. Daily personal contact between the chief of staff and the assistant chief of staff of the field agency was essential. Thus, the command post of the Field Agency Center was located in Borisow on the Beresina River and later in Smolensk in close proximity with the headquarters of Army Group Center, and likewise the Command Post South was always located at the same places as the headquarters of Army Group South (Poltava, Kharkov, Starobelsk).

Similarly, cooperation between the command post on the one hand and the commander of the supply district and the chief of heavy truck transportation on the other was so close that between these posts any geographic separation proved impractical. This provided possibilities of constant and immediate, personal cooperation and exchange of views. For relations with all other headquarters and agencies other means of communication were relied upon.

Aside from one officer and a few telephone details for the maintenance of their own switchboards, the field agencies did not have their own communication units. The field agencies depended upon detachments from the signal units of the army group and the use of the communication network of the high command. For connections with the bases of the supply district existing lines and radio communications were used. Although radio and teletype messages and telephone conversations having tactical contents were transmitted under priorities the assistant chief of staff of a field agency was authorized only an "exceptional conversation" as highest priority rating, and the commander of a supply district received only a so-called ammunition conversation priority. Under these conditions the transmission of supply orders was often rather difficult.

All the more important then was the communication route by motorcycle messengers and couriers in automobiles. In the course of time, particularly when the fronts changed less quickly, a system of constantly available teams was established. For connection with the supply and administration branch of the armies, the relay team of the army group headquarters could be utilized in most cases. In their own areas, that is within the supply district, the field agencies

were dependent upon their own devices. For this purpose motorcycle messenger platoons were at their disposal, as a rule one platoon at the command post, and a second platoon with the commander of the supply district. The motorcycle messengers of the field agency usually took messages to the nearest supply section or base. The recipient then passed on the messages to the next base or supply section. All operated on fixed schedules. Reports came to the field agency in the same way.

Because of the long distances to be covered, the extent of the Dnieper Supply District has already been pointed out as an example, because of the bad condition of the roads and the increasing insecurity caused by partisan activity, which often precluded driving at dark and often even imposed considerable detours, it had to be expected that five or seven days could elapse from the issue of an order until its arrival at all interested posts. The same length of time was required for the return trip.

It must be mentioned here that astonishing results were accomplished by the motorcycle messengers particularly in the fall and winter in the battle against bad roads, bad weather, and in the face of constant partisan menace. Nevertheless cold and snow finally forced the replacement of the motorcycle with the automobile.

A similar relay system was established by the chief of heavy truck transportation for the employment of his units. He also established check points on the main supply roads through which the heavy truck transportation units were registered and reported.

Technical means of communication and the transmission of orders and messages by motor vehicle, however, could not replace personal contact. Hence, every opportunity was used to discuss orally the guiding principles for supply management. The assistant chief of staff of the field agencies and the most important technical officers visited the chief of supply and administration of the armies and their technical officers mostly by airplane in order to cover the great distances. For such purpose a few airplanes were assigned to the field agencies for their exclusive use, either Klemm sport planes or the Fieseler Storch type. Their ranges were just sufficient for the distances to be covered. The planes were often used to detour routes threatened by partisans.

Occasionally the army chief of supply and administration and their most important assistants were gathered for conferences at the field agency.

The commanders of the supply districts made it a point on their part to maintain personal contact with the commanders

of the supply sections and the commandants of the bases by visits or conferences. Since airplanes were not available for these conferences, a participant might be absent from his post for several days.

#### V. RESULTS OF EXPERIENCE AND CRITIQUE

The field agencies, which existed from the spring of 1941 to September 1942, directed the supply of the army groups in the east during the preparations and the assembly for the eastern campaign, for the great advance in the summer and fall of 1941, during the retreats and defensive battles in the winter of 1941-42, and for the offensives in the summer of 1942. In these combat periods the field agencies, on the whole, fulfilled the expectations described above.

The preparations and the supply of the assembly areas were faultlessly completed. Especially, the field agencies proved useful administrators in providing the supplies and reserve stocks for the motorized and armored units which entered their assembly areas in the last days before the beginning of the attack and could scarcely have taken care of their provisioning themselves.

In the plans for the eastern campaign, the Dnieper River was generally indicated as the first goal of operations.

After it had been reached, a continuation of operations with part of the units across the Dnieper was considered. All measures and calculations of the field agencies had this end in view. Supply to the west bank of the river was accomplished without difficulties, but when portions of the major forces continued to advance beyond the Dnieper and engage in tough position battles, as in the Smolensk area, the first difficulties arose.

These difficulties first appeared in July 1941 at the Field Agency Center. Here the command post during the extraordinary rapid advance, went forward with the headquarters of Army Group Center to Borisov on the Beresina River, while the commander of the supply district remained with the supply assembly area in Warsaw. However, when the railroad lines of Volno-Molodechno-Polotsk and of Minsk-Borisov-Orsha became operative, uniform direction of the forward field agency supply troops was lacking. Control could not be exercised from the command post and regulation was no longer possible from Warsaw. This deficiency in organization and command was felt all the more when in July a thrust of the combined Second and Third Panzergruppen<sup>4</sup> toward Moscow was planned. As a corrective measure the Dnieper Supply District was

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<sup>4</sup>Armored force of the size of an army but operating in conjunction with an army.

established under a new commander, operating in the Minsk-Molodechno-Orsha-Bobruisk area. The Supply District Center remained in existence temporarily but gradually transferred all its stocks and facilities to the Dnieper Supply District, unless they had to be unloaded in the vicinity of Warsaw because of the insufficient capacity of forward lines. Evacuation from the front was also increasingly assumed by the Dnieper Supply District. Some weeks were required before field agency reserve stocks were accumulated in close proximity as to be available to the army, and facilities as hospitals and depots established,

A little later a similar situation arose with Army Group South. There the Dnieper was reached at a later date than was the case with Army Group Center. This fact naturally affected the supply favorably. After the battle for Kiev, at the end of September 1941, the attack was immediately continued, and the First Panzergruppe in particular quickly pushed ahead to the Sea of Azov. The field agency, owing to the lack of sufficient railroads, was incapable of shifting in time its stocks and facilities across the Dnieper. When the battle for Rostov was already under way during the second half of October 1941, all facilities of the Field Agency South were still located west of the Dnieper.

The First Panzergruppe was placed in a serious supply situation, especially as the battles east of the Dnieper continued to be severe and would not develop into pursuit actions. The crisis mainly arose as a result of the destruction of the Dnieper bridges. Added to this was the complete absence of hard-surfaced roads. The Ukrainian highways were good and solid during dry weather but impassable to vehicles when even slightly wet.

At that time the situation was remedied by having the Field Agency South detach a large quantity of its heavy truck transportation facilities to the chief of supply and administration of the First Panzergruppe to cover the distance from the Dnieper to the Mariupol-Taganrog area and by employing thousands of the horse-drawn, indigenous vehicles--the "panye carts." Only when the railroad line Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino was put in operation at the end of November 1941, and the front came to a standstill on a general line from Rostov to east of Stalino, did a cessation in supply activity occur.

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in one push without a pause, particularly when rail transportation is inadequate or is lacking and when the roads are as bad as they are in the eastern theater. It may well occur that after complete annihilation of the enemy forces during operations extending over 500 kilometers, pursuit action will follow immediately and place no great demands upon supply, particularly of ammunition, and evacuation. But when such operations are continued beyond the 500 kilometer limit against an enemy that has retained his full fighting power and without a time interval in which to adapt the railroads for use and provide supplies, increasing difficulties must result. Supply will lag behind tactical events and finally cause the forward movement to stop, unless an enemy counteroffensive produces an even more serious consequence.

The example also shows that a large geographic separation between the command post and the commander of the supply district must not occur. The latter belongs well forward in the area of new organization; during deactivation of the supply district, his duties can be assumed by a deputy. The new and hazardous conditions immediately behind the advancing armies require his presence and constant, oral exchange of views with the assistant chief of staff in charge of the field agency.

In the case of Army Group South, the question must be raised whether the field agency, during the slow advance to the Dnieper, would not have been able through utilization of all means to concentrate large stocks on the western bank of the river by the time the armies arrived there. The supplies could then have been sent after the troops immediately after a crossing had been forced.

In September 1942 the field agencies of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration were converted into supply and administration branches of the army group headquarters in whose areas they were committed. One reason, among others for this change, was that the enforcement of the directives issued by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration or by the field agencies occasionally met with difficulties. These difficulties might occur even at army group headquarters, where viewpoints by no means always agreed with the views of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. But, now and again, differences also developed with the armies over whom the field agency could not exercise the authority of an army group commander. The authority of a very distant Chief of Army Supply and Administration was unable to compensate for this, especially as the assistant chiefs of staff in charge of the field agencies were

comparatively young general staff officers. On the whole they were younger than the chiefs of supply and administration of the armies. Age made itself felt all the more, since the army chiefs of supply and administration, who were objecting to measures of the field agencies, naturally found frequent support from the army commanders and their chiefs of staff.

These difficulties could have been remedied by making the field agency part of the army group headquarters. This would give the assistant chief of staff the authority of an immediately superior headquarters over the armies in the event of differences of opinion; the commander in chief and chief of staff of an army group headquarters would then take a more direct interest in the enforcement of measures advised by their own chiefs of supply and administration.

There were even more important and objective considerations which led to the decision to convert the field agencies. The field agencies had been created for Blitzkrieg. This type of offensive required a liberal hand in the supply of the most important items of ammunition, fuel, and food. Other classes of supply dropped into the background for a time if the campaign really was to be completed in a few weeks or at most a few months. However, the

campaign in the east was not only not completed in Blitzkrieg fashion, but also the offensive of the summer of 1942 had taken such a course as to make clear that battles in Russia, of unforeseeable duration, were yet to come, and that a strategic defense would have to be faced which in its fighting would largely assume the character of a position war.

As a result numerous new requirements for the field forces appeared, such as construction material for positions, new weapons, spare parts of all kinds on the largest scale, billeting equipment, and fuel. The supply system had to become not only substantially more comprehensive, but it also had to be very closely coordinated with the army group command, in order that newly arising needs come to its attention in time. This voluminous and detailed work was considered more safely guaranteed when the field agencies, as supply and administration branches, became an integral part of the army group headquarters.

The basic idea of the field agency, that is to be a representative of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration in a remote theater, was used later in other theaters of operations. But the independent field agencies, which were solely organs of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration

no longer existed anywhere. In the above cases the supply and administration branches of army groups now received additionally the character and the responsibilities of a Chief of Army Supply and Administration field agency.

Thus, the Supply and Administration Branch of the Commander in Chief Southwest in Italy was simultaneously the Chief of Army Supply Field Agency Italy. In this capacity, it was in charge not only of the supply of the army group but also of the supply of the entire Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht auxiliaries in Italy. The supply officer, as assistant chief of staff of the field agency, determined the distribution of supply trains for all branches of the Wehrmacht within the limits of the number of scheduled trains made available by the transportation agencies for supply and regardless of whether the trains contained items the issue of which was a responsibility of the army group supply and administration branch or of the Luftwaffe, Navy, or Organisation Todt. For the exercise of his functions the Chief of Supply and Administration Italy had a large organization called Supply Bases Upper Italy at his disposal for the accumulation of reserve stocks and for the accomodation of evacuated men, animals, and materiel of all kinds.

## CHAPTER 5

THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN  
ARMY GROUPI. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF OF SUPPLY  
AND ADMINISTRATION

The chief of supply and administration of an army group was assigned to the chief of staff of the army group and directed the supply of the army group according to the latter's orders and in accordance with the directives issued by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. He continuously reported to the commander in chief and to the chief of staff of the army group on the supply situation and on the basic directives of the Army High Command and, whenever needed, received decisions from the army group commander. He pointed out new or impending difficulties, especially those that might affect operations. On instructions from the army group commander, he arranged for the subdivision of the operational area and was responsible for administrative matters.

The chief of supply and administration supervised the work of the specialists and technical officers of his staff in order to insure uniformity. The specialists, in their capacity as special section chiefs, had extensive independence and responsibilities. The special section chiefs were assigned for administrative purposes to the chief of staff of the army group or, if they were his seniors, to the commander in chief. As specialists they were under the command of a chief specialist.

In all supply matters the chief of the supply and administration branch communicated directly with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and with the chiefs of supply and administration of the armies and when necessary, with the chiefs of supply and administration of the corps or the supply and administration officer of the divisions, and with civilian and military agencies of allied nations. He was authorized to sign some very important matters, after he had reported their contents to the chief of staff or the commander in chief, such as the special orders for supply or the special orders for the supply troops. He also had the authority to sign letters which were without basic significance or did not contain value<sup>able</sup> estimates concerning the recipient. All other papers were signed by the commander in chief or the chief of staff.

## II. THE ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF

1. The Chief of Supply and Administration. The chief of supply and administration of an army group insured the supply of the troops and the organizations under the command of the army group with all necessary items by means of early planning, provident requisition or procurement, assembly, and delivery. Items no longer needed he returned to the rear area. He was the tactical manager of the supply of the army group and planned far ahead on the requirements of the operational and supply situations. He ordered advances and withdrawals of the supply bases, the supply sections, and the depots and camps along the line of the main effort. All his activities and orders were directed toward strengthening the fighting capacity and efficiency of men, animals, through utilization of all the possibilities of supply and procurement.

The chief of the supply and administration branch had to guarantee that the commander would be able to carry out his intentions in conformity with the requirements of operations and combat and be able to remain as unaffected as possible by the supply situation. Disturbances in supply which

might affect the commander's freedom of action had to be reported to his chief of staff or to the commander in chief.

To fulfill his duties, a chief of supply and administration had to:

- a. Know the operational situation and the intentions of the commander.
- b. Know the supply situation on the basis of reports from and conversations with the chiefs of supply and administration of the armies, the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, and other interested agencies.
- c. Evaluate the supply situation through appropriate orders and requisitions.
- d. Inform subordinate troops on the supply situation, particularly on shortages and difficulties, intentions and deliveries.
- e. Inform the Chief of Army Supply and Administration through daily reports and written estimate of supply situation.
- f. Submit requisitions to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.
- g. Plan providently supply bases, supply sections, and facilities, as well as the timely transfer, installations, and employment of the supply troops.
- h. Request improvement of routes, means, and facilities of communication (railroads, roads, paths, waterways, ships, ports, airfields) and of loading and unloading facilities at transfer points.
- i. Cooperate closely and continuously with the operations branch, the engineer and signal officer, neighboring army groups, allies, the agencies of economy and transportation and all other agencies involved in supply procedures.

- j. Insure cooperation within the supply and administration staff itself.

For the exercise of his functions a chief of supply and administration had the supply and administration branch at his disposal (Charts # 11 and # 12), two general staff officers with their branches, and other special sections. The officers and officials were attached to the chief of supply and administration for duty and to the chief of staff or to the commander in chief for administration. The specialists and technical officers received directives pertaining to their special field from their service chiefs.

In the course of the war, the functions of the chief of supply and administration became increasingly voluminous and frequently exceeded the field fixed in the manuals. The steadily growing shortage of supplies and the steadily deteriorating transport situation required increasing intervention in all fields of supply.

2. Chief of Supply Section I. The chief of supply section 1 (second general staff officer) was the first assistant and regular deputy of the chief of supply and administration. He had an assistant designated as O-2. The chief of supply section 1 was assigned certain subsections including ammunition, fuel, weapons and equipment, supply

shipments, army postal service and had a technical officer at his disposal for special assignments.

The primary obligation of the chief of supply section 1 was to direct the supply of the army group within the spirit of the directives issued by the chief of supply and administration for the management of supply and in accordance with the operational and the supply situation. Listed below are the functions performed by him.

a. Procure the basic data for supply management, such as the operational situation through close contact with the operations branch, the supply situation through collection and evaluation of all reports (up-to-date maintenance of supply situation map), the situation estimate as determined by the operational intentions and the supply situation.

b. Control and distribute combat supplies such as ammunition, fuel, weapons and equipment; coordinate with the subsections concerned and in accordance with the allocations made by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration; supervise the delivery of supplies to the special sections.

c. Direct supply shipments of the army group by railroad, inland, waterways, and heavy truck transportation

in conjunction with other transportation agencies, sea in conjunction with the Navy, and air in conjunction with the Luftwaffe. Control over railroad and inland waterways was exercised by establishing a priority for trains and towns from the zone of interior, by regulating the rate of travel (arrow shipments), and by determining the destinations. The checking service at frontier crossings and a knowledge of the location of shipments were particularly important for control purposes.

Because of the importance of the heavy truck transportation, the commitment of this most mobile supply instrument was reserved to the general staff officer in charge of supply section 1 in order to give him a means to overcome supply crises.

d. Commit supply troops, after providently planning the advance or withdrawal of supply bases, in cooperation with the appropriate branches and special sections.

e. Brief daily the special sections on the tactical situation, within the limits permitted by secrecy regulations, and its effect upon supply management.

f. Issue special supply orders to the supply troops to whom the sections delivered their materiel. In the course of the war it had become apparent that orders for supply

management tasks, because of their urgency, must be issued singly. The special supply orders, henceforth, contained only announcements, directives, and orders of a general and fundamental nature particularly pertaining to administration.

g. Organize and train supply troops in conjunction with the special sections and the commander of supply troops. The supply of the army postal service was accomplished directly between the Army Field Postmaster in the Army High Command or the agencies in the zone of interior on the one hand and the armies on the other. The army group interposed only for the purposes of planning and organizing and in the event of difficulties of shipments.

3. Chief of Supply Section 2. The chief of supply section 2 was the fifth general staff officer in the staff group; his assistant was designated O-5. In addition, his staff included a technical officer for prisoners of war and Section VII (military administration). Listed below are the functions of the chief of supply section 2.

a. Territorial functions: Subdivide the operational area into army areas and communications zone. Administer the operational area, either through the military administration section or in conjunction with the civil administration or the allies; transfer the executive power

to the commander in chief of the army group when ordered by the Army High Command. Exploit the country in conjunction with the other specialist supply and administration branches, especially IVa, the economic branch, and the military or civil administration. Procurement was a responsibility of the administrative agencies. Employ the civilian population when necessary.

b. Evacuation measures: Vacate the combat zone of civilians both for the protection of the population and for the relief of the troops; vacate certain areas on higher orders.

c. Control refugee movements during major engagements or retreats in order to guarantee freedom of movement to the troops and to insure an orderly and protected flow of refugee streams.

d. Control all phases of registration, collection, and transfer rearward of prisoners of war and, in order to accomplish these purposes, direct the use of prisoners of war facilities and necessary transportation. For the exercise of his functions the chief of supply section 2 had at his disposal the prisoner of war facilities (collecting points and transient camps), the commander of prisoners of war, the commandant of the communications zone with his

military administration and town headquarters, and, when necessary, special police forces. A chain of command as in the case of the special section chiefs did not exist. The administrative superior for the prisoners of war facilities was the commander of prisoners of war, and for the commandant of the communications zone it was the army commander.

4. The Special Sections. The special sections IVa, IVb, V, Technical (T), and Economics (wi) were branches of the supply and administration staff of the army group and were assigned to the chief of supply and administration. They worked according to his orders and directives relative to supply management.

In their capacity as administrative officers, medical officer, veterinary officer, motor transport officer, chief of technical troops, and chief of economic affairs, all worked with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration on their own responsibility under the technical directives of their service branch superiors. In their technical capacity they were the administrative superiors of the supply troops under their command and the service branch superiors of the technical officers whose troops were under the command of the army group. The chiefs of the special sections issued the necessary technical directives and directed the technical officers of the army group in their fields.

a. The chief of special section IVa was generally in charge of provisioning and simultaneously performed the duties of an army group administrative officer.

(1) Provision for food and fodder. The bulk of food and fodder were always provided from the zone of interior usually by rail. On the basis of requisitions from the army group the trains were loaded by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration from the food magazines, either as single item trains, such as flour, vegetables, oats, corn, raw fodder, and cattle, or as mixed food trains adjusted to the miscellaneous requirements of the troops. The orders for the trains came from the army group (general staff officer in charge of section 1), who assumed direction of the trains at the frontier crossings. The trains were sent either whole or divided to the armies or to the bases of the army group. When a train is sent to an army group base it is done to stock up reserves and to supply those forces not under the command of an army but directly under an army group.

Procurement from the country where the army group is stationed is resorted to only when there is a surplus or when the flow from the zone of interior is interrupted. It is carried out on a requisition of section IVa, in

conjunction with the Economic Section. In general, only hay, straw, vegetables, potatoes, grains, and livestock are taken. Post exchange supplies are also handled by the section IVa.

(2) Provision for individual clothing and equipment. These items were, primarily, provided by supply channels from the zone of interior, either through the clothing offices of the army group or by direct shipment to the troops. Important in this field was the timely requisition, collection, and delivery of the special clothing called for by season and weather. Supply of clothing and equipment included maintenance material, maintenance equipment, establishment of maintenance shops, and the early repair of damaged clothing and equipment.

(3) Provision of billeting requirements. The essential items included cantonment buildings for men and animals, stoves, fuel, and light bulbs. Only the distribution was under the special section IVa. Provision of these items proceeded through regular supply channels. Until the spring of 1944 army construction agencies, units for the repair of billets were under the command of the IVa. Thereafter, these units were converted into technical companies and assigned to the commander of technical troops.

conjunction with the Economic Section. In general, only hay, straw, vegetables, potatoes, grains, and livestock are taken. Post exchange supplies are also handled by the section IVa.

(2) Provision for individual clothing and equipment. These items were, primarily, provided by supply channels from the zone of interior, either through the clothing offices of the army group or by direct shipment to the troops. Important in this field was the timely requisition, collection, and delivery of the special clothing called for by season and weather. Supply of clothing and equipment included maintenance material, maintenance equipment, establishment of maintenance shops, and the early repair of damaged clothing and equipment.

(3) Provision of billeting requirements. The essential items included cantonment buildings for men and animals, stoves, fuel, and light bulbs. Only the distribution was under the special section IVa. Provision of these items proceeded through regular supply channels. Until the spring of 1944 army construction agencies, units for the repair of billets were under the command of the IVa. Thereafter, these units were converted into technical companies and assigned to the commander of technical troops.

(4) Accounting and finance. The army group administrative officer directed all affairs of accounting and finance within the area of the army group. He was in charge of supplying the field forces with money to be disbursed as pay or the payment of bills.

(5) Administrative troops. The army group administrative officer had administrative troops assigned to him which included administrative baker, and butcher companies, food offices, food stores, clothing offices, and field finance offices. He was the administrative and technical superior of these troops and gave orders for their employment and assignment.

(6) The army group administrative officer was also the technical superior of all administrative officers (administrative officials prior to 1944), of the army group. He issued directives in the form of administrative orders and maintained the personnel files of the administrative officers.

b. The chief of special section IVb was chiefly concerned with medical problems and simultaneously performed the duties of army group surgeon.

(1) Care for the wounded and the sick. The chief responsibility of the IVb was the care for the wounded and

the sick of the army group and to restore them to duty as soon as possible. He directed the employment of hospital and medical facilities of the army group and the armies and the evacuation of the movable and ill who could not be returned to duty in a few weeks. As fighting continued he provided for a timely organization of the hospitals. Evacuation was accomplished by ambulance battalions, hospital trains, and, if necessary, also by motor vehicle convoys, airplanes, and ships.

He was also in charge of supervision of the surgeons and medical personnel; for this purpose particular surgeons were at his disposal. He was required to make available to the personnel branch of the army group as soon as possible the men who had been nursed through convalescence in the army group facilities.

(2) Health service for troops and population. The chief of section IVb was responsible for taking prophylactic measures for the prevention and suppression of diseases and epidemics among the troops and the civilian population in the army group area. Preventive measures included vaccinations, supervision of hygiene and food, delousing stations, bathing establishments, as well as directions and instructions for the prevention and reduction of

epidemics and diseases. For humanitarian reasons and for the protection of the troops, these measures were also extended to the civilian population in the army group area.

(3) Casualty reports. Section IVb completed the reports to the wounded, ill, dead, and missing as received from the field forces and medical installations within the army group area and passed them on to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

(4) Provision of medical material and equipment. Section IVb controlled the supply of all medicines and medical equipment either through direct deliveries from the zone of interior or from its medical supply pools. Delivery was made by means of hospital trains, ambulances, or in urgent cases by motor vehicles or airplanes.

(5) Medical troops. To assist him in the discharge of his duties, the army group surgeon had under his command medical troops who manned the hospitals, medical facilities, medical pools, ambulance battalions, hospital trains, and in part, medical airplanes. The surgeon was the administrative and specialist superior of all medical personnel and issued orders concerning their employment and assignment.

(6) The army group surgeon was also the specialist superior of all medical officers (surgeons) of the army group. He issued directives in the form of medical orders and maintained the personnel files of the medical officers.

c. The chief of special section IVc was responsible for the care of livestock and simultaneously performed the duties of army group veterinary.

(1) Care for sick and wounded horses. His chief responsibility was the supervision of the care for sick and wounded horses and animals of the army group, and their restoration to service as soon as possible. He controlled the employment of the veterinary facilities of the army group and the armies and the evacuation of movable horses and animals that could not be restored to service within a short period. Evacuation was accomplished by railroad and horse transport convoys.

(2) Prevention and suppression of epizootics and animal diseases contagious to troops and the populace was an important responsibility of the army group veterinarian. If necessary, veterinary officers also cared for and treated livestock belonging to the civilian population.

(3) Supply and replacement of horses. The chief of section IVc was the technical officer in charge of the supply and the replacement of horses. He kept reports of animals on hand and lost, distributed to the field forces newly arrived horses, horses recovered in army group installations, and captured horses, and purchased and sold animals in the operational area.

(4) Supply of veterinary items and horseshoeing materials. Section IVc controlled the supply of veterinary items and horseshoeing materials through requisitions and deliveries from the zone of interior or the veterinary supply pools.

(5) Veterinary troops. To assist him in the discharge of his duties, the veterinarian had under his command troops who manned the hospitals, supply pools, veterinary companies, and horse transport convoys. The veterinarian was the administrative and specialist superior for employment and assignment.

(6) The army group veterinarian was also the specialist superior of all veterinary officers of the army group. He issues his directives in the form of veterinary orders and maintained the personnel files of the veterinary officers.

d. The chief of special section V was responsible for all motor vehicles and was simultaneously the army group motor transport officer. Section V handled the entire motor transportation of the army group including wheel and track vehicles and tanks. Supply of fuel, however, was controlled by the general staff officer in charge of section 1.

(1) Supply and replacement of motor vehicles. On the basis of the motor vehicle availability and on the tactical requirements, Section V, in conjunction with the operation and training officers and the supply and administration branch, distributed the motor vehicles coming from supply or from the repair service. If necessary, the section determined priority of allocations to units. Section V also registered and distributed captured vehicles. To perform these functions Section V keeps detailed motor vehicle stock lists based on a very accurate reporting system.

(2) Repair of motor vehicles. Section V's most important function was the repair of motor vehicles, which constituted a difficult task since the German army employed a multitude of different vehicle types. However, by expedient employment of motor transport troops (motor pools, maintenance companies, army motor plants), through utilization

of civilian repair facilities, and through assumption of all major repairs from the field forces, good and quick repair service was provided. Some of the army group installations performed general overhaul and difficult repairs. When repairs could not be accomplished in the facilities of the army group or if it could be accomplished better and faster in the zone of interior, the vehicles were shipped to interior installations.

(3) Procurement and supply of spare parts. The procurement, supply and distribution of spare parts were of greatest decisive significance, but exceedingly difficult, since the multitude of vehicle types prevented the stock piling of all spare parts. The spare part stocks of an army group, despite holding some 30,000 to 60,000 tons, contained only a relatively small number of required spare parts. Non-standard spare parts were rarely on hand and had to be drawn singly from installations in the zone of interior. Difficulties of procurement necessitated the detachment of army experts as liaison agents to the major installations and manufacturing plants in the zone of interior.

(4) Supply and repair of tires. The scanty stocks of tires required the quickest and most careful

repair and distribution by the tire repair and the tire retreating groups.

(5) Motor transport troops. To assist him in the exercise of his functions, the army group motor transport officer, in his capacity as commander of motor transport troops, had under his command the troops in the motor vehicle and tank repair battalions and companies, motor vehicle and tank shop companies and platoons, tank salvage companies, motor vehicle wrecker platoons, army motor plants, motor pools, tire repair group, tire retreating group, and spare parts depot. He was the administrative and specialist superior for these troop units and issued orders for their employment and assignment.

(6) The army group motor transport officer was also the specialist superior of all the technical officer in the transport service of the army group. He issued directives in the form of motor transport orders and maintained the personnel files of these officers.

e. The chief of the technical service section was responsible for the technical aspects of supply and was simultaneously the chief of technical troops.

Section T handled the planning and execution of important technical jobs which were not performed by the army group

engineer commander (roads, bridges), the general of transportation (railroads, railroad facilities, cable railways, rivers), the navy (ports, ships), and the Luftwaffe (airfields). The section was, therefore, attached to the chief of supply and administration to assist him in certain, important supply functions.

(1) Establishment of supply facilities. This was accomplished by the construction, improvement, and furnishing of buildings, halls, and rooms for storage, shops, bakeries, butcheries, delousing and bathing facilities, hospitals, and billets. Other types of construction and improvement included approaches to supply facilities, minor bridges, loading facilities in ports, and railroad lines in depots, sawmills, gristmills, and other technical plants.

(2) Repair and maintenance of power and water lines and the establishment of connections to existing supply systems for essential industries as well as for the armored forces.

(3) Participation in the exploitation and increased production of mineral products such as coal, oil, manganese, and other important raw materials in conjunction with the economic section and indigenous agencies.

(4) Production of special gases and of wood-gas for motor vehicles.

(5) Production of construction and billeting material, equipment, sleds, and horse-drawn vehicles.

(6) Supply of construction material necessary for the production of supply facilities.

(7) Technical troops. For the performance of these functions the chief of section T was assisted by technical troops formed into technical battalions, and technical companies (army). He was also the administrative and specialist superior of the technical troops and issued orders concerning their employment and assignment.

(8) The chief of technical troops was the administrative and specialist superior of all technical officers.

f. The chief of the economic section was simultaneously army group economic chief.

(1) The functions of the economic section was to exploit for military use the civilian economy and the population of the occupied country. Through close cooperation with the supply and administration branches, the military and civil administrations, the Economic Branch of the Army High Command, and if necessary with the agencies of the

zone of interior and the allies, the economic section was to secure the greatest possible benefit for all. An essential phase was the creation of a balance between military requirements and those of the population.

(2) Economic details. For the performance of his tasks the army group economic chief had economic details under his command. If he was a military officer he was their administrative and specialist superior, if he was an army official he was only their specialist superior. He issued orders for their employment and assignment.

(3) The army group economic chief was the specialist superior of all economic officials, both administrative and specialist officials. He issued directives in the form of economic orders and maintained the personnel files.

### III. OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF OF AN ARMY GROUP

1. Theory of Supply Operations. All personnel engaged in army supply must always be aware that army supply is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The goal must be to provide for the fighting troops in such a manner that the tactical commander can enjoy the greatest possible freedom to make his decisions and to take measures at any time on the basis of the tactical requirements and the development of the battle situation.

The tactical commander, on his part, must be aware of what supply is capable of accomplishing. He must particularly know that his dependence upon supply increases as his demand on the troops increases, as raw materials and food in the occupied country become scarcer, as the productivity of the zone of interior becomes more limited, and as the transport situation becomes more strained. This dependence will be of an even increasing degree in the course of a prolonged war.

Army supply is a matter of leadership, just as it is in the case of the tactical commander, and not merely a technical supply organization for a requisitioned or available item. This holds particularly for the chief of supply and administration and his two general staff officers who are charged with the supply of an army or army group.

Accordingly, tactical command and supply management must always cooperate closely and inform themselves mutually of the tactical and the supply situation: at the earliest moment the tactical command must tell supply management of its intentions and in turn the supply agency must inform the tactical command of the corresponding possibilities.

Along with this cooperation there must be a close, personal contact with the subordinate units and the troops

themselves. Only in this manner is real supply management possible. This particularly holds true for the chief of supply and administration and his specialists. In addition to a continuous orientation by means of daily and special reports, supply personnel must obtain a fuller picture of the situation through visits to subordinate tactical commanders, supply and administrative branches of corps, divisions and smaller field units, including the front line combatants.

An actual supply situation includes not only the equipment of the field forces, but also requirements and wishes of the troops, and the effectiveness of measures taken by the supply management. Beyond that, the visits serve to orient the troops on the supply situation at large and promote their understanding of the potentialities of the supply management. The more strained the supply situation is, the more important these visits are, and the more frequent they should be made. As far as practicable, members of the supply troops should repeatedly be dispatched to the fighting forces in order that an understanding of their mutual spheres of action be implanted.

Providential planning, timely establishment or reorganization of supply bases, concentration of supplies at

the right time and place, and delivery of the supplies to the fighting troops, as well as directives for employment and issue of orders to the supply troops are the basic considerations for a successful supply management.

Rigid control over the allotment of supplies, uniform direction of the entire transportation system and of transport movements, stern control and direction of all supply troops and facilities are indispensable prerequisites for the supply management. These elements even gain more significance when the demands of the fighting troops become greater or when the supply and transport situation becomes more strained.

2. Daily Events in the Army Supply and Administration Staff of an Army or Army Group. The supply day began with an orientation on the events of the preceding night with respect to the consumption of supplies, the results of measures taken by the army supply and administration staff on the previous evening or during the night, the location of rail and motor vehicle shipments to the troops, the receipt of supplies by the troops and at army or army group depots, and the special tensions and emergencies needing immediate remedy. The staff also orientated itself on the tactical events that occurred during the night, the

development of the battle situation, and potential new views and decisions of the tactical command.

On the basis of this information the chief of supply and administration or the general staff officer in charge of Section 1 conducted a daily discussion, in which the staff was informed of the tactical and the supply situation, and the section and branch chiefs received directives for their work.

The remainder of the day was generally devoted to conferences with individuals about particular measures. In the afternoon the preliminary reports of the subordinate units began to arrive upon the day's activities, with estimates of daily consumption, and presumable requirements.

These reports serve as a basis for the measures to be taken by the supply sections in the evening such as concentration of supplies and transportation, urgent requisitions to the army group or to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, reallocation of supplies among the units, preliminary notification to supply troops of their missions and of potential changes in their employment of transfer of supply bases, and emergency and auxiliary measures.

After the arrival of the daily reports from the subordinate units in the evening, and after the orientation

by the staff on the final battle situation of the day and the intentions of the tactical command for the next day, it was time to make the daily situation estimate. A new basis was now established for such actions as the distribution and delivery of available supplies and other supply measures, the final requisitions to the army group and Chief of Army Supply and Administration, the orientation of the chief of staff and commander in chief on the supply situation of the troops and the measures taken, reports on the supply situation to the army group and Chief of Army Supply and Administration, notification to the subordinate units on expected deliveries and assistance from the army or army group, distribution of missions and directives for issue to the supply troops, and the transfer or change of supply bases of the army or army group.

During the night, and if necessary, decisions have been obtained from the commander in chief and the chief of staff on the items listed above. These actions are now accomplished or initiated, and the final supply situation in the form of the daily report is dispatched to the army group or to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

3. Preplanning for Supply Management Operations. The preparation of a supply plan for new operations and for

changing situation requires time, and a preparation period varying in length according to the size of the operation and the requirements of supplies and supply troops must be allowed. The tactical commander must be aware of this fact and disclose his intentions early. Even when secrecy forbids notification of the entire supply and administration staff, at least the chief of supply and administration and his two general staff officers and, if possible, the heads of the branches and special sections involved must be briefed sufficiently early to allow them to prepare their measures.

After having been notified of the intentions of the tactical command the chief of supply and administration branch and his assistants calculate the requirements for supplies and supply troops for the operation and consider any necessary new reorganization of supply troops and supply bases. If possible, the requests and wishes of the units which are commissioned with the execution of the operation should be obtained.

On the basis of this calculation, the reserve stock situation of the army or army group, and the availability of supply troops, the chief of supply and administration presents his requisitions to the army group or Chief of Army Supply and Administration for additional supplies.

His estimate of the supply situation is submitted to the commander and the chief of staff. The estimate should clearly indicate all points able to affect the operation in any way in order to bring them to the attention of the tactical command.

After finally fixing requirements and receiving notification from the army group or Chief of Army Supply and Administration of the assistance and special allocations to be expected, and after obtaining necessary decisions from the commander and the chief of staff, the chief of supply and administration and his assistants take the actions that will insure the fighting forces the required amount of supplies at the proper time and that will enable the supply troops to attain the greatest possible efficiency.

4. Means of Supply Management. As is the case for operational commands, personal and technical communications are indispensable in supply management. Communication is established with the tactical command, subordinate units of the fighting forces, supply troops and facilities, neighboring units, superior headquarters, and equal-level headquarters. The communications system also includes civil and military agencies and authorities of the occupied country as well as those of the economy and industry. Personal

contacts are maintained by frequent visits to the fighting troops, regular conferences and exchange of viewpoints on the part of all cooperating agencies, continuous exchange of views and experience through visits or of signal communication with equal-level agencies, and the employment of liaison officers.

The signal commander installs the required telephone connections forward, rearward, and laterally to connect with the existing military and civilian telephone networks. Teletype connections are established with the most important headquarters. In the event that further connections are needed, radio communication is available. To this end the signal commander generally keeps a mixed signal company consisting of telephone operating, telephone constructing, and radio details at the disposal of the supply and administration staff. In addition to the employment of signal communications, motorcycle messengers and liaison airplanes are also available.

## CHAPTER 6

## THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN ARMY

I. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF OF SUPPLY  
AND ADMINISTRATION

An army chief of supply and administration was assigned to the chief of staff of the army and directed the supply of all units under the command of the army according to the chief of staff's directives but within the orders issued by the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the chief of supply and administration of the superior army group. He continuously reported to the army chief of staff and the army commander on the supply situation and on basic orders or instructions from superior headquarters and, if necessary, obtained decisions. He particularly pointed out developing or impending difficulties affecting operations. In the same manner he reported daily to the chief of supply and administration of the army group and to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

In addition to the supply of the troops the chief of army supply and administration, on instructions from the army commander, arranged the sub-division of the operational area, and was responsible for all matters relative to the executive power and military administration and cooperation with the civil administration. Whenever applicable, he issued the necessary directives of the chief of civil administration.

The chief of army supply and administration, in the interest of operations and overall supply of the troops, established uniform work standards for all specialists and technical officers assigned to him, although these officers retained extensive independence and responsibility in the special sections. In this capacity as well as administratively, they were directly assigned to the chief of staff, or to the army commander if they are the chief of staff's seniors in rank. With regard to their technical work, they were subordinate to their specialist superiors.

In all supply matters the chief of army supply and administration communicated directly with the chief of supply and administration of the superior army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and with the chiefs of supply and administration of the assigned corps and the supply officers of the divisions.

After reporting important matters to the army commander and the chief of staff, he was authorized to sign for the commander special orders for supply, special orders for the supply troops, and also letters without fundamental significance or which did not contain value estimates concerning the recipient. All other matters were signed by the army commander or the chief of staff.

## II. ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Chart # 13 and # 14)

1. The Chief of Supply and Administration. He directed the supply of an army by providing all units under the command of the army the supplies necessary for living and fighting. This he accomplished by continuous observance of the supply situation, provident planning, provident requisition or procurement, and concentration of supplies, and their timely delivery to the proper units. By his actions and orders he could constantly guarantee and enhance to the greatest possible degree the fighting and working efficiency of men, animals, and equipment through the utilization of all the supply potential afforded within the army area.

In this manner a guarantee could be created that would enable the operational command to make its decisions, to act

in conformance with the requirements of operations and combat, and to remain as unaffected as possible by the supply situation. Where disturbances of any kind in the supply system might interfere with the high command's complete freedom of action, the chief of army supply and administration reported this fact early to the army commander and the chief of staff.

In addition to a continuing knowledge of the tactical situation and the intentions of the commander, the chief of supply and administration was required to perform many supplementary tasks.

a. Prepare regularly estimates of the supply situation on the basis of daily reports and orientations from the subordinate chiefs of supply and administration of the corps or the supply officers of the divisions and independent units, on the basis of the reserve stocks of the army, and the possibilities afforded by the army area.

b. Plan providently and orient early all assistants of the staff on the intentions of the commander.

c. Submit daily reports on all classes of supply, prepare timely requisitions to the chief of supply and administration of the army group or the chief of army supply and administration, and maintain continuous briefing of his staff.

d. Provide for the cooperation of all branches of the army supply and administration staff in order that early procurement, concentration, and delivery of the supplies to the proper units at the required time and place be guaranteed.

The scarcer the supplies, the fewer the supply troops, the more strained the transport situation, the more rigid must be the control exercised by the chief of army supply and administration to meet the tactical requirements.

e. Cooperate closely with the operations branch and adjutant's office of the army headquarters, army engineer commander, and army signal commander, the chiefs of army supply and administration of the neighboring armies and other equal-level headquarters.

For the performance of his missions the chief of army supply and administration had at his disposal as assistant, according to the staff organization chart of the supply and administration staff of an army, two general staff officers with their special missions staff officers and assistants, specialists for certain special fields, and attached special sections.

The specialists were attached to the chief of army supply and administration in their duty capacity as special section chiefs but to the chief of staff or directly to the

army commander administratively. The attached specialists and the personnel in the career fields receive their technical directives from their specialist superiors.

2. Chief of Supply Section 1. The chief of supply section 1 (second general staff officer at an army headquarters) was the first assistant and regular deputy of the chief of supply and administration. He had an assistant designated as O-2. In addition, technical officers in charge of ammunition and fuel handled matters in their special fields according to his directives. The ordnance material officer notified the general staff officer in charge of section 1 prior to the issue of weapons and equipment.

The chief of section 1 was charged with the responsibility of all matters of supply management.

a. Prepare, collect, and evaluate all basic information for estimates on the supply situation and maintain the supply situation maps up-to-date.

b. Control and integrate the entire reporting and requisition system in close cooperation with the other branches and special sections. Harmonize requisitions of combat supplies with the stocks of the army and the allocations established by the army group or Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

c. Control allocations and safeguard deliveries of combat supplies (weapons, ammunition, fuel, equipment) to subordinate units. Supervise deliveries of other supplies to the troops in cooperation with the appropriate branches and special sections. Deliver supplies in conformance with the requirements of time, place, and everyday needs of the troops concerned.

d. Employ supply troops in cooperation with the appropriate branches and special sections; issue directives to the supply troops.

e. Control replacement shipments and motor transportation. Establish priorities and exercise rigid control over stock, supply, and transport.

f. Compile the special orders for supply and for the supply troops. In them, all current orders and directives for supply were consolidated that had general application and did not have to be issued as single orders because of their importance or urgency.

g. Handle all matters of organization and training of the supply troops, if necessary in conjunction with the appropriate branches and special sections. This function includes the attachment of additional supply troops to subordinate units or the requisition of such troops from the army group of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

Technical officers in charge of ammunition and fuel acted on all matters in their special fields relative to supply management. Their primary obligations were supervision of the provisioning of the troops, calculation of requirements, distribution and deliveries, adequate stockpiling at the army depots, and timely requisition from the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. In addition, they supervised the proper fitting out of the depots and the storage of supplies in them by the supply troops.

3. The Ordnance Materiel Branch. The ordnance materiel officer performed his duties with respect to ordnance materiel as did other technical officers. On requisitions, distribution, and delivery to the troops he and the operations and training officer cooperated closely with the general staff officer in charge of section 1 in order to safeguard the tactical interests of supply management.

The ordnance materiel officer also provided for continuous and speedy maintenance of ordnance materiel in the field shops of the army so that they be returned to the fighting troops as soon as possible, or for their shipment to shops of the army group or to the zone of interior. He registered captured ordnance materiel and made it available for its most practical utilization.

In addition, the ordnance materiel officer, as senior ordnance officer, was the administrative superior of the ordnance troops directly attached to the army and specialist superior of all ordnance officers and all ordnance personnel within the army area.

4. The Chief of Supply Section 2. The general staff officer in charge of section 2 was the fifth general staff officer at an army headquarters; his assistant was designated Q-5. A technical officer on his staff was in charge of prisoners of war and branch VII (military administration activities).

The primary duties of the general staff officer in charge of section 2 included matters relating to organization, administration, and exploitation of the operational area. Listed below are activities that came under his jurisdiction.

a. Subdivision of the operational area of the army into a combat area and an army communications zone. The combat area was to be kept as narrow as possible and limited in width to the fighting front of the division and corps in order to relieve the combat troops, as far as possible, for the care and responsibility of the rear areas. The communications zone was intended to bring the entire area not directly affected by the fighting into an orderly condition through uniform administration and direction.

b. Executive authority and administration in cooperation with the civil administration. A military administration was established over the enemy country immediately behind the fighting fronts to safeguard the interests of the Wehrmacht, while a civil administration was established over occupied areas which were distant from the front. In occupied enemy countries administration officials were chosen from among the indigenous population; in allied areas local civil administrations were instituted or retained; and in Reich areas the existing civil administrations were retained.

The delegation of executive authority within the army area to the army commander was left to the discretion of the Army High Command. Whenever this authority was delegated, the chief of army supply and administration was vested with the responsibility and section 2 was charged with the conduct of these affairs. The same holds in the event of the institution of a chief of civil administration for the army area.

Territorial functions and affairs were controlled by the military administration headquarters under the direction of general staff officer in charge of section 2.

d. General matters relating to opportunities for exploitation of the country were correlated in close

conjunction with section IVa and the army economic chief on the one hand and with the military or civil administration on the other. The general staff officer in charge of section 2 saw that the demands of the Wehrmacht were harmonized with the requirements of the country and the population. The exploitation of a country was a responsibility of the civil administration or of the army economic chief and his agencies in areas under military administration.

The general staff officer in charge of section 2 handled all evacuation measures. In this connection, evacuation was concerned with vacating the combat area to protect the population and to relieve and safeguard the troops, vacating other areas on higher orders, and controlling refugee movements in the event of major engagements or retreats in order to guarantee freedom of movement for the troops and to ensure an orderly and protected flow of refugee streams.

The technical officer in charge of prisoner of war affairs handled all matters of registration, concentration, and evacuation of prisoners of war according to directives from the general staff officer in charge of section 2. Troops were to be speedily relieved of the care of prisoners of war through establishment of PW collecting points as far

forward as possible. Prisoners were put into orderly and safe custody by settling them into army camps or evacuating them to installations of the army group or the zone of interior. To afford opportunities for interrogation, close contact was maintained with the intelligence officer. The PW officer was responsible for counting captured materiel within the army area.

5. Branch VII. The chief of branch VII was an upper-level military administration official handling all technical matters of military administration, executive authority, and cooperation with the civil administration. The assistance of branch VII could be requested by all other branches and sections on administrative questions. The branch chief was the specialist superior of all military administration officials within the army area and handled their personnel files.

6. Attached Special Sections. The special sections IVa, IVb, IVc, V, Technical (T), Economic (Wi) and the Army Field Postmaster were parts of the supply and administration staff of the army and operated according to the directives and uniform guidance regulations of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. In their capacities as army administrative officer, army surgeons, army

veterinarian, army motor transport officer and commander of motor transport troops, commander of technical troops, army economic chief, army field postmaster they were independent and worked on their own responsibility according to directives issued by their specialist superiors at an army group headquarters or in the Office of Army Supply and Administration. As such they were the administrative superiors of the supply troops attached to them and issued directives to the appropriate supply troops and supply personnel of the entire army area. They were responsible for the supervision of their special fields and for the training therein.

a. The chief of special section IVa was simultaneously army administrative officer.

(1) The procurement of food and fodder was generally achieved through supply shipments from the zone of interior routed to the army through the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The shipments were either single item trains containing one definite item such as flour, cattle, vegetables, oats, raw fodder, or mixed food trains loaded according to the requirements of the troops. It was the function of section IVa to forward these trains or parts of them according to requirements

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directly to the subordinate units or to take them into the army installations (army food depot, baker, and butcher companies) from which the troops received their allocations.

Procurement from the occupied country was resorted to only if the area where the army was located had suitable surpluses or when supplies arriving from the zone of interior were insufficient for some reason. Such procurement was accomplished in closest conjunction with the army economic chief either by the latter on his own or, on his instructions, by agencies of the army administrative officer. In certain cases, after volume and area have been fixed, procurement might be entrusted to subordinate units. Primarily, the following items were subject to procurement from the country: hay, straw, vegetables, potatoes, cattle. In order to increase the country's economic value, the army administrative officer through the army economic chief established programs for the cultivation of certain food items. Linked to the food supply was the supply of the field forces with post exchange items.

(2) Supply of the troops with clothing and equipment. Supply of this category proceeded through channels from the zone of interior. The items were delivered

or issued through the army clothing offices or their depots. A special responsibility of the army administrative officer was the timely concentration and delivery to the troops of such special clothing called for by season and weather, such as winter clothing, summer clothing, rubber boots, and so forth.

A further part of the clothing supply was the provision of repair material and equipment or machines. If necessary, special repair shops were installed by the army administrative officer to facilitate speedy repair of damaged clothing and equipment.

(3) Supply of the troops with billets. This aspect of supply particularly included tents and cantonment buildings for men and animals, stoves and heating material, and lighting facilities. These items were supplied through the army billeting administrations attached for these purposes to the army administrative officer.

(4) Accounting and finance. Branch IVa was charged with all accounting affairs (settlement accounts, money, and exchange) and with providing unit and field finance offices with money. The money (soldier's pay, allowances, bills), was disbursed by the paymaster's offices (IVz) or field finance offices.

(5) For the performance of these various duties the army administrative officer had under his command the administrative troops of the army including baker, butcher companies, army food offices and army food depots, army clothing depots, army billeting administrations, and army field finance offices. He was administrative and specialist superior of these troops and gave orders for their employment and assignment. In addition, he was the specialist superior of all administrative officers within the army area, issued directives to them in the form of administrative orders, and handled their personnel files.

b. The chief of special section IVb was simultaneously army surgeon.

(1) Care for the wounded and sick. The army surgeon supervised the care of the wounded and sick for the purposes of conserving valuable manpower and maintaining the fighting power of the field forces. In order to relieve the field forces the army surgeon took all movable, seriously wounded and ill into army medical and hospital installations. In accordance with requirements, anticipatable casualties and strength of the army, the army surgeon directed his subordinate medical and hospital services to prepare the necessary number of beds. Protracted cases

were evacuated beyond the army area to installations of the army group or to general hospitals or hospitals in the zone of interior in order to provide room prior to major engagements, which promised a high casualty rate or in the event that army hospitals already were overcrowded. Evacuation proceeded by means of ambulance battalions and scheduled hospital trains. In addition, the army surgeon made available auxiliary convoys and auxiliary hospital trains, whenever needed, in conjunction with the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the army group transportation officer. Such additional means of transportation as ships and airplanes were also used in appropriate locations. To relieve the medical units of the field forces, he pushed his collecting points as far ahead as possible and accepted the wounded there. The particular obligation of the army surgeon, however, was the medical care of the wounded. He had his own section of advisory medical specialists at his disposal. The army surgeon also routed recovered cases back to their units as individuals or placed them at the disposal of the personnel branch of the army in compact convalescent units.

(2) Health service for field forces and population. Prophylactic measures for the prevention of diseases and epidemics both among the troops and among the

population were very important responsibilities of the army surgeon. His services to this end were preventive vaccinations, supervision of hygiene and of food, establishment of delousing stations and bathhouses, instruction of troops on the construction of emergency facilities of this kind, and cooperation in measures against the effects of weather.

Both for reasons of humanity and for protection of the field forces against infection, these measures included the population within the army area. If the indigenous medical personnel of the country was insufficient, army medical officers were assigned for these purposes.

(3) Casualty reports. On the basis of reports from the troops and medical installations, the army surgeon continuously compiled and adjusted the total losses of wounded, ill, dead, and missing. The reports were passed through operations and personnel channels and on to the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

(4) Supply of the troops with medical material. For the supply of subordinate units, hospitals and medical installations of the army with medical material, medicines, and first-aid material, the army surgeon has an army medical park. This depot was stocked, upon requisitions through

supply channels, by the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. The army surgeon delivered the items to the field forces generally by empty ambulances or hospital trains.

(5) For the performance of his mission the army surgeon had under his command the medical troops of the army hospitals, ambulance units, hospital trains, medical units, and medical park. He was their administrative and specialist superior issuing the necessary orders for their employment and duties.

At the same time the army surgeon was the specialist superior of the entire medical personnel of the army area, over whom he exercised supervision relating to medical services. He issued directives in the form of medical orders. He was also in charge of maintaining the personnel files of the medical personnel.

c. The chief of special section IVc was simultaneously the army veterinarian.

(1) Care for sick and injured horses. The army veterinarian primarily provided for the sustenance of horses and assumed a share in maintaining the mobility of the field forces. This purpose was accomplished by the care for sick and injured horses. Through the army veterinary

hospitals and the veterinary companies of the army, he took over all horses whose recovery required a longer period in order to relieve the divisional veterinary companies. Horses requiring very long reconvalescent periods were transferred from army installations to installations of the army group or in the zone of interior.

For transportation, horse transport companies or convoys were available to him in addition to replacement trains. If necessary, he organized additional convoys. To relieve the combat units, horses were picked up at army collecting points that were located as far toward the front as possible. The army veterinarian supervised the veterinary activities of the entire veterinary personnel of the army.

(2) Supply and replacement of horses. The army veterinarian in conjunction with the army operations and training officer and the chief of army supply and administration handled the supply of the field forces with horses. He distributed and delivered the remounts to the field forces. Remounts were taken from the army horse park and from among the horses recovered in the veterinary hospitals. The parks were provided with horses through supply channels from the zone of interior on the basis of requisitions. If necessary the army veterinarian arranged the purchase of the

inspection of horses from the occupied country in conjunction with the army economic chief and the administrative officer. He was also in charge of the registration and distribution of captured horses.

In order to assure a timely and sufficient supply of remounts the army veterinarian regularly registered the losses of horses and reported them to the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration.

(3) Prevention and suppression of epizootics among army mounts and among the animal stocks of the occupied country. Prevention of, and whenever necessary fight against, epizootics are primary responsibilities of the army veterinarian. This holds equally true for the horse reserve of the field forces and for the cattle stocks of the occupied country in order to maintain the mobility of the troops and to protect the cattle as a source of food. If necessary veterinary officers are employed to care for the civilian animal stocks in the event that there are not enough indigenous veterinarians.

(4) Supply of veterinary and horseshoeing materials. The army veterinarian was in charge of supplying subordinate units and the army veterinary services with veterinary and horseshoeing materials. Issue and delivery

to the units were determined by their requirements and by reserve stock in the army veterinary pool, which, in turn, received its stocks from the veterinary pool of the army group or the zone of interior.

(5) For performance of his missions the army veterinarian had under his command the veterinary troops of the army veterinary hospitals, horse transport units, horse park, veterinary parks, and veterinary companies. He was the administrative superior of these units and issued orders concerning their employment and missions.

At the same time the army veterinary officer was the specialist superior of the entire veterinary and horse-shoeing personnel within the army area. He issued his directives in the form of veterinary orders. In addition, he maintained the personnel files of the veterinary and horseshoeing personnel.

e. The chief of special section V was simultaneously army motor transport officer and commander of motor transport troops. The army motor transport officer handled all phases of motor transportation including wheel and track vehicles and tanks, but he was not responsible for fuel supply. Fuel was the responsibility of the fuel branch of special section I. The primary duty of the motor

transportation officer was to guarantee the commitment and battle worthiness of all units through the best possible supply and the greatest possible readiness for use of the motor vehicles. He handled and supervised the supply of motor vehicles of all units under the command of the army in conjunction with the operations and training officer and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. He distributed and delivered vehicle replacements according to types and requirements either from vehicle reserve stocks in the army motor pool or from the army group and the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. If necessary, he effected a balance of vehicles among the units. He registered all captured motor vehicles and put them to the most efficient use.

For this purpose he kept accurate stock amounts indicating types and weights of the vehicles. Through a rigid reporting system he maintained an up to date register on the number of motor vehicles on hand and informed the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration. In the distribution of vehicles he provided for greatest possible uniformity of vehicle types in the various units.

To maintain and enhance the efficiency of motor vehicles, he provided for speedy repair of damaged vehicles.

He received as many vehicles as possible, especially those that took a long time to repair, into the army installations (army motor pool and motor vehicle maintenance companies). Civilian repair shops within the army area were utilized to the greatest possible extent by cooperation with the army economic chief. Heavily damaged vehicles and those that had to be rebuilt were evacuated to installations of the army group or to the zone of interior.

In order to achieve proper maintenance and repair, the procurement and delivery of spare parts by the motor transport officer were of special importance. He had to ensure a continuous flow of supplies to the spare parts group and, if necessary, to the central spare parts depots by requisitioning them from the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and by procuring them from the occupied country in conjunction with the army economic chief. The units and the army maintenance installations were supplied by the spare parts group and the central spare parts depots. This is also true for the replacement and repair of tires by the tire repair group and the tire retreating group of the army.

For the performance of these duties the army motor transport officer, in his capacity as commander of the motor

transport troops, had under his command the motor transport troops of the army; motor vehicles and tank maintenance battalions or companies, motor vehicle and tank repair shop companies, tank salvage companies, motor vehicle wrecker groups, army motor pool, spare parts group, tire repair group, tire retreating group, and if necessary a central spare parts depot. He was the administrative and specialist superior of these units and issued orders concerning their employment and missions. Depending on the motor transport situation and the requirements of combat operations, the commitment of motor transport troops, especially of the maintenance units at the points of danger, was of special importance.

The army motor transport officer was the specialist superior of all administrative motor officers and of the motor transport personnel within the army area. He exercised supervision and issued his directives in the form of motor transport orders. He handled the personnel files of the officers.

f. The chief of special section T was simultaneously commander of technical troops. The chief of special section T was in charge of planning and construction of all technical structures within army area, which were not a responsibility of the army economic chief or the engineer troops.

These structures were of several classes: new construction or enlargement of warehouses or storage rooms, workshops and other technical installations, enlargement of bakeries and butcheries, delousing and bathing installations, enlargement of hospitals, and billets of all kinds.

Another mission of section T concerned the power supply (water, gas, electricity). The commander of technical troops ordered the technical battalions to repair and, if necessary, to set in operation waterworks, gas works, and power plants within the army area as well as connections to Wehrmacht consumers. If necessary, the civilian plants of military importance in the occupied country were operated and maintained in conjunction with the army economic chief.

Section T controlled the supply and delivery of construction materials to the troops except for engineer material or finished building material (cantonment buildings, tents). Demands that could not be met out of the supplies furnished by the army group or the Chief of Army Supply and Administration, particularly lumber, was filled from the resources of the occupied country in conjunction with the army economic chief. For this purpose sawmills were established and lumber processing plants put into operation.

Ready-built construction materials, such as window frames, doors, parts of cantonment buildings, construction material for bridges, were used. Section T cooperated, if necessary, in the manufacture of locally produced native vehicles, sleds, etc.

All measures and construction projects were carried out in close conjunction and cooperation with the army economic chief, the army engineer commander and the Organisation Todt. In his capacity as commander of technical troops the chief of section T was the administrative and specialist superior of the technical troops of the army (technical battalions, technical companies) to whom he issued orders concerning employment and missions. Technical troops were generally not attached to subordinate units of the army.

If the post of the chief of section T was not held by an officer the commander of the technical battalion or the senior commander assumed the position of the commander of technical troops.

g. The chief of the economic section was simultaneously army economic chief. The interests of the economic section lay in the agriculture and food economy, the business economy, and the forests and lumber of the occupied country. The section estimated the capacity and the exploitation of

army area. On this estimate of the economic situation on the one hand, and the ascertainment of the demands of the Wehrmacht and the civilian population on the other, the economic section based its plans and controls. In occupied areas under a civil administration, the section advised the organs of the civil administration and presented to them the demands of the Wehrmacht; in occupied areas under military administration, it ordered and enforced any possible or necessary production of goods. In the latter case, the economic section tried to harmonize Wehrmacht needs with those of the civilian population. In areas with civil administration any harmony was the Wehrmacht's responsibility.

All measures for exploitation were undertaken in close cooperation with the second assistant general staff officer in charge of section 2, section 1, VII, section IVa, and with all other sections of the army headquarters that might be concerned. All that has been said relative to economic control holds equally true for the registration and employment of the country's human labor force. All shipments for the economic section were controlled in direct concurrences with the army group transportation officer. In the event of a strained transportation situation, including motor transportation, cooperation with the general staff officer in charge of Section 1 became necessary.

For the performance of his duties the army economic chief had under his command economic details and economic reconnaissance details, to whom he issued orders for employment and missions. He was their specialist and administrative superior.

As army economic chief he was assigned to the army group economic chief and received his directions from him as a part of the entire military economic organization.

h. The Army Field Postmaster (APM). The army field postmaster controlled the mail service including the air mail of the entire army. The field mail was routed by the Reichspost (Reich Postal Service) through central mail directing centers to the field mail distribution points of the army. From there the mail, unless movement through a field mail transshipping station was necessary, went directly to the army post offices for delivery to the troops. The shipment of mail from the troops to the zone of interior proceeded on the same route in reverse.

In view of the influence of mail service upon the morale of the troops, the APM Section utilized every possibility for a speedy delivery of mail. In addition to taking all possible precautions relating to practical service, the section cooperated closely with the railroad agencies, particularly

the Reich railroad directorates, the general of transportation, and the army group transportation officer. All means of transportation including airplanes and ships were utilized.

By continuously orienting himself on the locations of army units through the general staff officer in charge of Section 1 and the operations officer, the army postmaster arranged for the redirection of mail destined for transferred units.

The army field postmaster kept a current index of APO numbers filed at his office and assigned available APO numbers to newly created units in accordance with the procedures required to maintain secrecy.

The army field postmaster was the administrative superior of all the army's field postal installations which included post offices, field mail distribution points, and local field postal units and was the specialist superior of all field postal service personnel within the army area.

In his capacity as an army field postmaster he was assigned directly to the Army Field Postmaster, who was his specialist superior and who issued the necessary directives relating to the field postal service.

## CHAPTER 7

THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A CORPS<sup>1</sup>

The only supply management organization in a corps headquarters was its own supply and administration branch; supply troops were at its disposal solely for the supply of the corps headquarters units. This illustrates the fundamental differences between division and corps; the supply and administration branch of a division was not only a managing but also, with the aid of the supply troops, an executive agency. The supply and administration branch of a corps directed the supply of the entire corps including the subordinate divisions; but with its supply troops it carried out only the supply of the corps headquarters troops, corps staff, corps signal battalion, and so forth. The actual supply channel ran from the army directly to the division. The intermediate corps headquarters merely controlled the

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<sup>1</sup>Since chapter 8 will be concerned with the supply mechanism of a division, only the fundamental differences between a corps and a division with respect to supply processes are treated in this chapter.

supply of its subordinate divisions, that is it was an intermediate station on the command and reporting channels. Actual intervention was, however, possible in that the chief of a supply and administration branch within his supply area could order an equalization of supply or mutual assistance among the subordinate units. But, to carry out such actions, divisional supply troops had to be used since the corps, as mentioned above, had no forces at its disposal for these purposes.

This absence of an adequate supply mechanism, at least from the viewpoint of assisting the divisions, induced several corps to augment their supply troops by using extra personnel and materiel from the subordinate field units. In the east, the great distances between the army bases and the front very often could not be covered by the divisional supply troops, and the army with its convoys could not meet the divisions halfway. Thus the corps was obliged to lend help by the establishment of a supply base of its own that was more easily attainable for the troops. This necessity justified the additional detachments, undesirable in themselves, from the divisions to strengthen the supply troops of the corps. With these augmentations the corps staff could then take part in the execution of supply management.

In this case, corps not only played its role, as according to regulations was its normal function in supplying the subordinate units, but it was more or less able, according to the degree in which its supply troops had been reinforced, to interpose in the actual process of supply itself.

The chief of supply and administration was the second general staff officer in the corps headquarters staff and was assigned to the chief of staff. In accordance with standing procedures he directed the supply of the entire corps and was responsible to the commanding general and the chief of staff.

His functions coincide with those of the supply officer of a division. Besides control of requisitions and allocations, his chief opportunity to intervene in a critical supply situation within the corps consisted of the authority to balance stocks among the subordinate units. Without transportation means of his own, he had to employ the convoys of the subordinate units.

Besides control of supply the chief of the supply and administration branch had responsibilities in the economic field just as did the divisional supply officer. He had greater possibilities for economic activity since the corps rear area was more extensive. Also, because of this vastness

of area, the safeguarding of the supply roads in enemy country became important as well as their improvement.

The duties of the various special branches with respect to supply management coincided in all essential points with those of the special branches of a divisional supply and administration branch. Since the chief of corps supply and administration was limited in possibilities for action, the special sections could hardly take part in the supply processes of the subordinate units either. If they had any manpower at their disposal at all, it was only sufficient for the supply of the corps headquarters troops. To understand the proper position of corps, the statement made above must be borne in mind.

It often happened that army supply troops were attached to the various corps sections. This in reality meant the advance elements of an army supply base. These elements then came under the administrative as well as specialist control of the corps special sections. For example elements of army administrative troops could be attached to the corps administrative officer for the establishment of a food distributing point or an army medical company to the corps surgeon for the establishment of a medical clearing station or a field hospital. By such measures the supply channel from

the army to the division was shortened and the supply process for the divisions facilitated. Such detachments were particularly necessary in the case of a corps committed far away from the army base.

Corps headquarters had a commander of corps supply troops and a corps field post office. The commander of corps supply troops had a supply company and approximately 100 tons of motor transportation. With these means he carried out the missions of the supply and administration branch for the supply of the corps troops; reconnaissance, stockpiling, and the administration of ammunition, fuel and food distributing points.

Upon receiving reinforcements of supply troops from the army, the commander of corps supply troops could without difficulty enlarge the already existing distributing points. In this manner the requirements of the subordinate divisions were met and the army and the corps were able to render them great assistance. The necessary reinforcement of corps supply troops, of course, could be attained also by detachments from subordinate divisions.

A corps workshop platoon, also under the control of the commander of corps supply troops, was initially attached to the ordnance materiel section or section V until, in the course

of the war this unit, as motor transport unit and an ordnance unit was attached to the corps engineer and the senior ordnance officer.

The corps field post office carried out the same mission as a division field post office, but its functions were generally limited to the corps headquarters troops and did not cover the subordinate divisions.

The functions of the supply and administration branch of a corps primarily lay in the supply management field, but corps could extend these functions, as described, by appropriate measures on its own initiative. The necessary equalization of supply stocks among subordinate units through proper distribution of army allocations was achieved when the chief of supply and administration and his special branches obtained an accurate picture of the state of supply of the divisions on the various sectors, not only on paper but also on the spot. Thus a uniform supply was ensured. Planning and timely concentration of supplies on the basis of the tactical situation, as with the division supply officer, constituted the foremost responsibility of the chief of corps supply and administration.

## CHAPTER 8

## THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION SECTION OF A DIVISION

## I. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIVISION SUPPLY OFFICER

The second general staff officer (supply) was assigned to the first general staff officer (operations). The supply officer managed the supply of the division according to directives from the operations officer. He was responsible that the troops be timely and sufficiently supplied with all necessary items.

The supply officer continuously reported to the division commander on the status of the supply situation. He communicated directly on routine supply matters with the chief of corps supply and administration, or in the case of direct attachment to an army, with the chief of supply and administration of that army. The supply officer was regularly informed of the combat situation and also of operational intentions in order to initiate in time the necessary supply measures. Early in such briefings, he must point out to

the commander supply difficulties that may affect the operations. In the same manner, he reported daily to the chief of the supply and administration branch of the superior corps or the superior army.

For the various classes of supply, specialists were employed (chart # 16). They received directives concerning supply from the division supply officer irrespective of their rank. They kept constantly up to date in their respective fields and gave the supply officer provident suggestions concerning supply and evacuation. Suggestions, which they submitted in the form of orders, were examined by the supply officer who adapted them into the special orders. These specialists exercised disciplinary control over the supply troops attached to them such as the divisional administrative officer and the division medical officer. For the wartime organization of the supply troops of an infantry division see Chart # 16.

Smooth cooperation within the division supply and administration branch depended upon the personality of the supply officer. Smooth functioning benefited the troops for whom the whole work was done. The supply officer had to guarantee the attached specialists a great amount of independence and responsibility, but, in difficult situations,

he had exerted his own will against officers who, for the most part, were his seniors. This was frequently the case when the tactical situation changed suddenly, and decisions had to be carried out at short notice without long conferences.

In all supply matters, the supply officer communicated directly with the chief of supply and administration of corps or army and with the officers in charge of supply at the units within the division who, as a rule, were special mission officers on the regiment or the independent battalion staffs. The supply officer was authorized to sign for the division commander the special orders for the supply troops. The special orders for supply were signed by the operations officer.

In case of a stable situation or of a fixed front, the officer controlled the necessary subdivision and supervision of the communications zone of the division according to directives from the division commander. For this purpose he cooperated closely with the intelligence officer of the division. The organization of this zone and the assignment of area and town commanders was carried out with the aid of the supply troops, who, as a rule, were billeted in this zone and to whom he was authorized to give orders. An especially important element of this particular function was the expedient

planning and speedy execution of all necessary road construction jobs. These were carried out in cooperation with the division engineer officer, with the aid of engineer forces, elements of the supply troops and, if necessary, voluntary, compensated labor details from the civilian population.

Evacuation of the civilian population necessitated by the combat situation was directed by the supply officer in cooperation with the intelligence officer according to directives from the division commander. In conjunction with the appropriate specialists he effected the concentration, provisioning, and shipment to the rear of the people concerned.

Military police service within the division communications zone was generally entrusted to the supply officer by the division commander. This duty particularly included the maintenance of discipline and order within all units of the troops not engaged in combat, supervision of preparedness for passive and active air raid protection, and construction of certain bases in accordance with the tactical situation. For the performance of military police service, the supply officer had under his command military police troops with whose aid he also carried out the collection and evacuation of prisoners of war.

Especially during the second half of the war, the supply officer was required more and more to direct his primary

attention to supervision of the supply process from the division supply base to the foremost line rather than to the handling of supply matters in offices. He was obliged to do so also by his responsibilities which went beyond supply and which in part have been shown.

During his absence from the command post, supply was usually handled according to his explicit orders by the O-2. Management of supply essentially involved two procedures: an estimate of the supply situation on the basis of the daily report and information submitted by the supply officers of subordinate units, and the daily reports from all supply sectors, continuous briefings, and timely requisitions to the chief of supply and administration of the corps.

The quasi-delegation of routine matters to the O-2 freed the supply officer for additional action, though it naturally did not relieve him of the responsibility for supply management nor prevent him in any way from taking action himself in important matters and decisions. This division of labor was possible only when a capable, second special missions staff officer was available, who was selected on the basis of his civilian vocational background.

For the performance of various technical duties, the supply officer had at his disposal, according to the job

distribution plan of a division supply and administration branch, a second special mission staff officer and specialists for various supply fields (chart # 1). The functional attachment of special section chiefs to the supply officer has been treated. Administratively they were assigned to the division commander. With respect to their special field they received their directives, as did the personnel of the career specialists, from the appropriate specialist superiors of higher headquarters and are obliged to comply with these directives.

## II. THE SPECIAL SECTIONS WITHIN THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

### 1. Special Sections Assigned.

a. The second special missions staff officer. The second special missions staff officer (O-2) was the first assistant of the supply officer and his regular deputy. He handled supply management in conformance with directives from the supply officer to as great an extent as his aptitude permitted in order to give the supply officer time for the supervision of supply operations. The functions of the O-2 included the following:

- (1) Collection and evaluation of all basic data for an estimate of the supply situation and their tentative

compilation; maintain an up to date supply situation map.

(2) Control the reporting and requisition system in cooperation with the specialists.

(3) Employ supply troops, issue directives to the commander of division signal troops in cooperation with the specialists.

(4) Make tentative compilation of special orders for supply. Consolidate the current orders and directives governing supply that concerned the whole division and did not have to be issued as single orders on account of their importance.

b. The specialists for ammunition and fuel. The ammunition specialist and the fuel specialist of the supply and administration section managed all matters of their special field within the framework of the section. They supervised the delivery of their respective items of supply, the calculation of requirements, distribution and shipment of supplies, adequate stockpiling at division distributing points, and timely requisitioning from the army through the chief of corps supply and administration. In addition they supervised the organization of the distributing points and the storage of supplies in them by the supply troops.

c. The ordnance material section held a similar position with respect to the division supply officer. Requisitions, submitted in accordance with the war equipment accounts and distribution, were prepared in cooperation with the division operations officer.

The ordnance material officer provided for the speedy repair of lightly damaged materiel in the workshop platoon of the division supply troops and evacuated heavily damaged materiel to the army field workshops. Captured ordnance materiel was registered, its expedient use within the division was recommended, and superfluous parts were evacuated.

As the senior ordnance officer on the division staff, the ordnance materiel officer was the superior of all ordnance officers and personnel of the division.

d. Specialist for economic affairs. The specialist for economic affairs, who for practical purposes should have a background of civil economics, directed the economic exploitation of the division area keeping in view the requirements of the population. To this end he cooperated with those special sections interested in native products. He surveyed the area relative to agriculture, forestry, handicrafts, and industry, arranged for any necessary adjustment, and, if necessary, provided for the construction of new production installations.

f. Field mail. The postmaster controlled the mail service of the division. With its own transportation the postal section carried the mail between army and division. A mail distributing point enabled the units to exchange their mail whenever they drew rations.

2. Special Sections Attached.

a. The chief of special section IVa was simultaneously division administrative officer. Section IVa provided the troops with food, post exchange items, clothing, equipment, and billets and managed all accounting and financial affairs.

(1) Supply of the division with food and fodder. Items of this category to a small extent were acquired by procurement from the occupied area. Most supplies came from the zone of interior. The items required were shipped direct upon requisition through corps by supply troops from army installations to division distributing points. For further transportation to the fighting forces, Section IVa had at its disposal the food trains of the units.

(2) Supply of the division with clothing and equipment. In accordance with requirements of the various units, these items were requisitioned through channels. After allocation and distribution on paper, the supply of these

items was effected through the channels of the army clothing office, the division distributing point, indential with food distributing point, and the food trains of the units.

The clothing supply included the procurement of maintenance material and equipment. The division administrative officer had to pay particular attention to early acquisitions of special clothing called for by weather and season.

(3) Supply of the division with billets. Tents, stoves, and lighting facilities were the principal items concerned under this heading, and were distributed by the same channels mentioned above.

b. The chief of special section IVb was simultaneously division surgeon. The division surgeon supervised the care of the wounded and the sick in order to save valuable manpower and thus maintain the striking power of the division. As far as possible and, to the extent that the tactical situation permitted, the slightly sick and slightly wounded were retained in medical installations of the division in order that they might be returned to the units after convalescence.

The evacuation of the wounded was effected by medical troops from the regimental aid station through the ambulance

loading point to the main dressing stations established by medical companies. Further evacuation was directed to army medical installations according to directives from the corps or army surgeon.

The division surgeon correlated reports from the subordinate units and medical installations and compiled the total losses of wounded, sick, dead, and missing, which he compared to reports received through the operations or the personnel sections before forwarding them to the supply and administration branch of the corps.

(1) Health service of troops and population.

Prophylactic measures for the prevention and suppression of diseases and epidemics within the division area were among the most important responsibilities of the division surgeon. To this end he exercised supervision over hygiene and food, preventive inoculations, and the construction of delousing stations and bathhouses. For humanitarian reasons and for the protection of the troops against infection, these measures were also extended to the civilian population in the division area. If necessary, civilian medical officers were employed.

(2) Supply of the troops with medical materials.

Supplies of this sort were covered by requisitions and

received from the army medical park. Return trips of empty ambulances were utilized for transportation.

(3) Command authority of the divisional surgeon. The medical troops of the division, (two medical companies and ambulance platoons) were assigned to the divisional surgeon for the performance of duties. He was their administrative and specialist superior and issued the necessary orders concerning their employment and missions. The division surgeon was the superior of all medical personnel of the division and maintained their personnel files.

Particularly in the division, the chief surgeon discharged his duties in a completely satisfactory manner only when he directed medical care and evacuation on the spot with the fighting troops and from the division installations.

c. The chief of special section IVc was simultaneously divisional veterinarian.

(1) Care for sick and wounded horses. The proper care of horses so as to maintain the mobility of the division was the principal responsibility of the Section IVc. Evacuation of wounded or sick horses was accomplished through horse collecting points established immediately behind the fighting troops. Horses which would be unfit for a longer period were further evacuated to army veterinary

hospitals. Transportation was provided by the division veterinarian through the veterinary company. The division veterinary officer was also responsible for the supervision of the veterinary personnel of the division.

(2) Supply and replacement of horses. The division veterinary officer, in conjunction with the operations officer and the corps supply and administration officer controlled the remount service. He ascertained the requirements and effected the distribution and delivery of remounts from the veterinary company of convalescent horses and from the installations of the army of newly assigned horses.

The registration of captured horses and the recruiting of surplus horses from the country to the greatest possible extent was of major importance.

(3) Suppression of epizootics within the division and in the occupied country. Preparatory measures aimed at prevention of epizootics were of greater significance than fighting against them after they had broken out. The effectiveness and the success of prevention determined precisely the degree of mobility of the units and the working capacity of the local animal stocks.

(4) Supply of veterinary equipment and horseshoeing materials. According to requirements and allocations, the

division veterinarian accomplished the delivery of these items to the subordinate units.

(5) Command authority of the division veterinarian. The veterinary company of the division was assigned to the division veterinarian both administratively and with respect to their special fields. In addition he was the technical superior of the veterinary and horseshoeing personnel. Accomplishment of the veterinarian's responsibility was best secured by devoting a major part of his time to active supervision.

d. The chief of special section V was simultaneously division motor transport officer. Section V controlled all aspects of motor vehicle supply within the division with the exception of the fuel supply which was under a specialist for fuel attached to the operations officer. Nevertheless, the motor transport officer exercised technical supervision over the fuel distribution point and the supply of the units.

(1) The supply of motor vehicles to the various units was handled and supervised by the motor transport officer in conjunction with the operations officer and the supply officer. Issue to the units was governed by the number of vehicles on hand and those allocated or returned

upon completion of repair. Captured vehicles were included. The essential objective, in addition to achieving the highest possible degree of mobility, was to achieve uniformity of vehicle types with the various units, since it facilitated the procurement of spare parts and repair.

(2) According to directives from the division motor transport officer, the repair of damaged motor vehicles was accomplished by the motor transport troops in the case of light repairs, and by evacuation to appropriate facilities of the army in the case of heavy repairs. Civilian repair shops were utilized in cooperation with the economic section.

(3) Procurement and delivery of spare parts. The division motor transport officer applied himself with particular emphasis to this element of his mission. Repair capacity determined the size of the vehicle park and the mobility of the troops. Supplies were drawn by requisition or allocated from the spare parts group and the central spare parts depots of the army. The same procedure was used for replacement and maintenance of tires.

(4) Command authority of the division motor transport officer with armored divisions. The division motor transport officer was the specialist superior of all officers

in the motor transport unit and of the motor transport personnel within the area of the division. He exercised supervision over the specialists and maintained their personnel files. He was administrative commander of the motor transport troops.

3. The Commander of Division Supply Troops. The commander of division supply troops was not a member of a special section under the division supply officer. He was, however, closely connected inasmuch as the commander receives his directives and orders from the supply officer, or on his instructions from various special section chiefs, in the name of the division commander.

In his subordinate units (chart # 2) the commander of division supply troops had the manpower and transportation necessary for a smooth management of division supply. To create and then maintain the full efficiency of these units by purposeful employment according to the orders of the supply officer and to supervise their employment was the mission of the commander of division supply troops. Close cooperation and mutual understanding between the division supply officer and the commander of division supply troops was necessary for a quick achievement of the goal: equipment of the individual soldier with everything that he needed in combat.

The commander of division supply troops used his subordinate units to transport division supplies from the supply base of the army or from supply unloading stations whenever the specialists concerned had no supply troops of their own (for example, the ammunition and fuel specialists of the division supply section), or whenever the specialists' own supply troops were not sufficient (administrative troops of IVa). In this manner, the supply channel from the army base to the division supply base was afforded manpower.

In the establishment of a division supply base, consisting of the distributing points for the various items of supply, the commander of division supply troops not only assisted in stockpiling supplies, but he also carried out reconnaissance of the division supply route, of distributing points for ammunition and fuel, and supervised the appropriate construction work. After completing this principal mission, even simultaneously with it, the commander of division supply troops assisted in manning the supply route from the division supply base to the fighting forces themselves. Normally, the various trains of the fighting units are available for this purpose, combat trains, food trains, and, if necessary, combat vehicles of the unit. In major operations especially, however, even these trains are not

sufficient to cope with the increased tasks. When the columns of the commander of division supply troops are fully committed, the fighting troops are relieved and they soon become directly aware of the significance of the support units of the divisions whose employment at the army base and the division base they have hitherto seen nothing.

The distance of the supply base from the front line varied with the tactical situation. During an attack the supply base was pushed farther ahead by the supply officer, while during defense, just like the fighting troops themselves, the various distributing points were echeloned to the rear. Then they are not so immediately jeopardized in the event of an enemy breakthrough and can be shifted to the rear successively if a breakthrough is enlarged.

The question of how large a stockpile should be accumulated at a division supply base is of substantially greater significance for a division than it is for a higher headquarters. Within a division the supplies reached their destination and are consumed. It is, therefore, of consequence to what extent a unit in the vicinity of the front provides itself with an excessive or an insufficient stock. The tactical situation will give the decisive answer to this question. During an attack the division must keep its

stockpiles mobile, while during the defense the storage of supplies in outside depots affords an accumulation of larger stocks for the usually heavier defensive battle.

The establishment of a correct system of priorities was one of the principal tasks of the division supply officer. He was often confronted with the necessity of utilizing the available tonnage space on the basis of expected requirements in such a manner that presumable needs could be covered also. In doing so, it frequently occurred that the customary food transportation space was used for hauling ammunition, while food, as necessity commanded, was drawn from the country. Only a brief mention of this question demonstrates the need for keeping the second general staff officer mobile. But it also very clearly shows the high degree of responsibility that he bore to the division. It was of considerable importance if a single column of thirty tons carried a wrong or purposeless load because of inaccurate planning; it might mean a lack of precisely that supply element that would have been sufficient for the overcoming of a crisis and the saving of many lives.

This example may also be used to show the importance of the supply officer within the division supply and administration branch. On the basis of his knowledge of the

tactical situation he frequently had to make a decision regarding supply which was against the wishes of the special sections, whose viewpoints were on the whole too often limited to their respective fields. Only rigid supply management by the supply officer reserving independence and responsibility to himself could meet to the greatest possible extent the demand made on the supply machinery of a division. The division commander can then look ahead and need not look back.

### III. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY OF THE BRANCHES DURING THE WAR

In the course of the war certain changes were effected on the basis of experience and necessity resulting from the strained situation of personnel and material. The various branches of army supply and administration and the supply troops in their entirety were equally concerned. The functions of the Army Supply and Administration Branch (chart # 1) and the organization of the supply troops (chart # 2), which have been explained in the preceding pages, cover the period to approximately the middle of the war. From then on certain changes occurred.

Direct reductions in size of the entire supply and administration branch took place several times after 1942.

Both personnel and material were reduced by the Army High Command by changes in the table of organization and the table of basic allowances. The loss of personnel was offset by an increase in an individual's duties. This was practicable in most cases without detrimental effect upon the troops, especially as the specialist personnel of the supply units had meanwhile become trained to an extent that easily permitted them to take on the additional duties of another field. Owing to the nature of their employment the supply troops had fewer casualties; the old cadre was retained by the units and their efficiency was not endangered even by major reductions in numbers. Toward the end of the war, the supply troops had to increasingly permit the temporary detachment of personnel to serve in alarm units. This detachment of personnel affected efficiency, even though only temporarily, to a substantially greater degree. The alarm units inevitably suffered heavy losses during their commitment at the front, since the soldiers were inexperienced and unaccustomed to combat. The loss of specialists, who almost without exception made up the alarm units, were hard to refill. This arrangement, though in each case only temporarily, affected the efficiency in a substantially greater degree than the actual reductions.

The ammunition, ordnance materiel, and fuel subsections of the supply and administration section of the division originally were, as the foregoing passages show, assigned directly to the supply and administration section except for purely technical activities, directives for which were issued through ordnance channels. The senior ordnance officer was not necessarily the superior of another ordnance officer; both were assigned to the supply officer. From the beginning of 1944 and upon the introduction of ordnance inspectors, the ordnance officers, like all other officers of the division staff, were administratively assigned to the division commander and received their directives, as did the other special section of the supply and administration branch, from the second general staff officer. The same held for the fuel specialist, who was attached to subsection V.

Thus the two main supply fields, or rather their responsible specialists, were not directly assigned to the division supply and administration section on paper though in practice everything remained more or less as it had been. Distribution of ammunition and fuel, in accordance with the importance of these items, was always a responsibility of the division supply officer.

The ordnance troops attached to the division were assigned with respect to administration, operation, and supply to the senior ordnance officer, just as the motor transport troops were assigned to the divisional motor transport officer. Thus, they no longer formed a part of the unit of the commander of division supply troops.

The officer and officials of the corresponding career specialists were simultaneously assigned to the chiefs of these special sections.

The chief of subsection V was initially merely a specialist of the division. In 1943 he became the commander of motor transport troops and as such the administrative superior of all such units within the division.

An economic group, which was already an element of the division, was first formed on the basis of new requirements without a budget. As a subsection, it was immediately attached to the supply and administration branch. About 1942-43 this subsection, as subsection VII (military administration), was given a budget and in addition to economic affairs it also handled the military administration of the district concerned. In the east, especially, this subsection gained ever increasing significance in the course of time.

The administrative officials of subsection IVa were taken over during 1944 as officers in the special troop service. Thus they received the authority and assumed the duties of administrative superiors over subordinate supply troops and administrative personnel.

All engineer officers and a large part of technical motor transport officials were also made officers in the special troop service and were accorded the rights and duties of line officers over motor vehicle park troops and motor transport personnel.

The general reductions mentioned above were also directed toward the supply troops.

Upon the establishment of the senior ordnance officer, the commander of division supply troops lost the workshop platoon assigned to him and also the ammunition and fuel administration; on the wartime table of organization he retained only his convoys and the supply company. Ordnance troops and motor transport troops came under the command of the chiefs of the ordnance material section and section V.

In the last year of the war, supply regiments were established with the division, which took the place of the commanders of division supply troops. All supply troops of the divisions were combined in these supply regiments.

This arrangement meant centralization and, hence, simplification of the system previously used. Experience with these supply regiments was hardly sufficient to permit a definite judgment.

Ordnance and motor transport troops were organized from the supply troops taken from the commander of division supply. The commanders of the new units received appropriate designations, such as commander of motor transport troops, for example.

The employment of auxiliary volunteers within the supply troops became necessary in the course of time and was published accordingly in the wartime tables of organization. The percentages ordered were generally bearable; the auxiliary volunteers proved of greatly varying value. They were volunteers recruited from the occupied country and from among discharged prisoners of war. Auxiliary volunteers were employed only with eastern divisions; when these units were transferred to other fronts the volunteers remained in the east.

## CHAPTER 9

THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION SECTION OF AN ARMY  
GROUP HEADQUARTERS

This agency is treated here only for the sake of completeness since it was not concerned with supply management. It existed only until the fall of 1942. At this time it was absorbed by the supply and administration staff of the army groups.

The chief of the supply and administration branch of an army group headquarters was the advisory agent in all matters of supply. It was his duty, in particular, to represent the supply interests in all operational and tactical deliberation and planning, to point out the possibilities and the limitations of supply. He had to keep the army group commander, the chief of staff, and the operations officer continuously informed of the supply situation of the subordinate armies, to point out in time potential repercussions of the supply situation on tactical and operational

measures, and, if necessary, to represent demands for adaptation of operational measures to the reality of supply conditions.

The supply officer of an army group did not have direct influence upon the supply management of the subordinate armies, since the armies, in all matters of supply, were attached immediately to the Chief of Army Supply and Administration of the Army High Command. The supply officer, however, controlled the supply of all headquarters units of the army group.

In accordance with the carefully defined mission of the supply officer, his staff was small. It consisted of one general staff officer, one special missions staff officer, a few clerks, and a technical sergeant. The supply officer of an army group generally had no supply troops of his own. His assignment to the staff of the army group headquarters was regulated in conformity with directives in the Service Manual for the General Staff Corps.

During the Polish Campaign the Chief of the Supply and Administration of Army Group South was confronted with no substantial tasks exceeding the scope of the guiding principles given above. Certain difficulties, however, arose in obtaining timely information of the supply condition

of the subordinate armies. Copies of supply reports of the armies requested by the army group arrived rarely in time and frequently not at all, owing to overloaded communication lines. He kept himself informed through constant, personal contact with the chiefs of supply and administration of the armies, for which purpose an airplane (Fieseler Storch) was generally made available to him.

The only supply service assigned to the chief of an army group supply and administration branch was a post office which was manned by a liaison staff from the Army Postmaster. This staff was very important in view of the rapid course of tactical events leading to frequent transfers of units from one army to another.

During the preparation and execution of the French campaign, the supply officer was faced with increased responsibilities, since the strong armored units, destined for the breakthrough, were directly attached to the army group instead of the armies. Here the problem was to provide for the supply of these units through the armies under the command of the army group. This very often was a thankless and difficult task, since the armies understandably were more interested in the supply of the units immediately assigned to them than of army group headquarters units.

For armies and army groups, this kind of arrangement was fraught with difficulties and labor. There were numerous supply reports, which in most cases had to be submitted separately and in duplicate, to the Army High Command and the army group. Since the army group chief of supply had no command authority over the supply and administration officers, of the armies, the operations branch had to be called in whenever discrepancies arose. That the tasks, notwithstanding, were solved satisfactorily was greatly due to the good will and cooperation of all concerned.

During operations the Chief of the Army Supply and Administration Branch additionally assigned to an army group responsibilities for the organization of the shipment across the Meuse River of supplies unloaded at railheads on the German western frontier and in Luxemburg. For this purpose transport columns and laborers were attached.

Toward the end of operations a permanent staff from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration (a general staff officer, several special missions staff officers, and transport staffs) was detached to the army group to act as a link between the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and the subordinate armies. With this action, responsibilities of the army group supply officer were again reduced to his former functions.

Experience gained during the campaign in Poland and France showed that the supply officer of an army group, as regulations visualized him, could not do justice to the tasks that an army group headquarters encountered in supply management. The original idea had been to disassociate the army group from the general supply process and keep it informed on the status of supply through the supply officer only to such an extent as to enable it to consider the supply realities in its strategic and tactical planning. When tactical and supply measures became closely intertwined, primarily on account of the shortage of certain supplies, the army group headquarters had to be given a decisive influence upon supply management. Just as points of main effort were established for the operational and tactical sectors, the same was necessary for the supply sector especially with regard to ammunition, fuel, and transportation. For this purpose the armies had to be assigned directly to the army group with respect to supply as well, and the army group provided with the necessary supply and administration staff and supply services. This step was also influenced by the increase in the number of units assigned directly to an army group and the by-passing of the ordinary organization of subordinate armies. The steadily progressing geographic expansion of the theaters of operations also indicated this solution.

## P A R T   T H R E E

## TRAINING IN ARMY SUPPLY

The program for training personnel in army supply consisted of the procedures for the direction and particularly the management of army supplies. The kinds of training were the following: theoretical instruction, map exercises, training courses and demonstrations, and practical training in the autumn exercises and during the war.

In peacetime at the Kriegsakademie<sup>1</sup>, a four hour (two double lessons) course in army supply was in the curriculum. For purposes of instruction, tactical and strategic situations were assumed as bases, which were or had been treated in the classrooms, and were supplemented by appropriate supply situations. With the aid of such situations, the students learned the nature and the working methods of army supply and the use and application of the principles laid down in Army Regulations # 90. Special emphasis was placed upon careful calculation,

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<sup>1</sup>Equivalent to American Command and General Staff School.

logical build-up of organization, long-range thinking, and the multiform application of improvised aids. As instruction progressed, the preparation of written compositions, including topics such as estimate of supply situations and special orders for supply, was required. After completion of the Kriegsakademie, the student mastered the functional field of the supply officer at division level and was assigned to the supply and administration service of an army.

Further training of a number of general staff officers was accomplished on so-called supply trips, of six to eight days duration, which were generally directed by the chief of Branch VI of the Army High Command, and which dealt with the army's scope of authority. Practical demonstrations of supply facilities helped illustrate and reinforce the acquired knowledge.

In short-term training courses, officers and officials of the special services were instructed insofar as it was necessary, on subjects beyond the usual scope of their special training such as general principles of army supply, interrelation of the various supply field sectors, and use of makeshifts.

Reserve officers received their special training during reserve exercises or in training courses at the supply school.

Practical exercises of supply units operation alone were rare. Within a division, supply exercises took place during

the marching and fighting exercises of the 9th Infantry Division and on a smaller scale during the autumn exercises of garrison units close to the frontier.

In wartime the practical performance of the supply and administration service in all branches and at all levels allowed a far more illustrative and thorough handling of additional training than was possible in peacetime.

Besides training schools and courses in the zone of interior, training in the field by the field headquarters (army, army group) was practicable. Supply operations were conducted by appropriate map exercises. According to the time available, the circle of participants varied; it could include even the division supply officers and the chiefs of the most important special sectors.

## P A R T F O U R

## CRITIQUE

From the abundant knowledge gained in five years of war, it is now possible to discuss certain general principles as they, in part, were written in the new draft<sup>1</sup> of Army Regulations # 90 and the organization of supply.

Army supply is an element of warfare. It may decisively affect the course of operations. The possibilities of supply with respect to its capacity, its structure, its transport, and its management during operations must be taken into consideration in all planning. It must be the object of the commander to harmonize in time the tactical requirements and the supply possibilities. Knowledge of the principles of supply, and understanding of its capacity, and judgment of improvisation must henceforth be required of all commanders.

All the principles of modern warfare hold true for the management of supply. Provident action, early initiation of

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed

all necessary measures, flexibility and adaptation of changing situations, and the constant search for improvisation in all fields are the most important characteristics of supply management.

Only energetic personalities with clear vision and organizational talent can meet these high standards and in difficult situations find and accomplish those measures that are necessary to ensure the functioning and the maintenance of the striking power of the field forces. On supply depends the welfare of the troops. Supply management is concerned with depth. The chance of enemy interference, through airplane, rockets, partisan activities, or deep penetrations of mobile forces, causes the rear area to become a combat area also. In the establishment of rear installations this factor must be borne in mind. Supply troops must be trained and equipped as fighters. Their commitment as security garrisons in rear positions should be regulated and ordered as each individual case requires.

Supply bases are established in the rear of army groups or army areas. Their location is decisively influenced by available communications, particularly railroad and road connections. Supply installations must be scattered as far and wide as the traffic network permits. Camouflage and air raid protection, as well as local security, must be provided.

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The supply district, a part of the supply base, must work under a uniform command and, on the whole, only for a limited section of the front. It may be subdivided into supply sections and supply subsections.

A supply base is an aggregate, depending on the situation, of supply installations of all kinds at important traffic points. It frequently develops during the advance, in unsafe areas, as a backbone of supply registration and exploitation center of the country in performance of limited tasks.

In supplying a moving operation, one must avoid establishment of depots and keep the main supplies either rolling or easily movable in a sufficient volume of transportation as far as the traffic network permits. Of particular importance is the transportation and the fuel situation.

The principal goal of operational supply is to replace the means of combat used each day by the beginning of the next day. Especially when decisions impend, this principle entails maximum effort and fullest utilization of all transportation. Chief bearer of all supply transports is the railroad, and it will remain so in the future.

Motor vehicle transportation is a most important means for supply management. Heavy truck transportation is confined,

in general, to surfaced roads. If its tonnage is sufficient it may temporarily replace or at least supplement rail transportation. Rigid organization of commitment is necessary. Light motor transportation is used in supply runs from the rail heads to the depots and parks or for the direct supply of the divisions. Air transportation is very expensive and unsafe. Its use may become necessary as the only means for supply in critical situations, during special combined operations, for provisioning advance detachments with food, and in the event of temporary encirclement. For extensive operations it is indispensable. Uniform, rigid organization is the prerequisite for successful employment.

Distribution and use of supplies are important factors of supply management. The importance of supplies, but also the difficulties involved in their procurement, increase with the strength and the combat activity of the fronts to be supplied, and with the increasing strain of the war situation. Thus, they frequently are also factors to be considered by the operational command.

The purpose of any accumulation of supply stocks is to prepare for major operations. Larger stocks hamper the mobility of troops and supplies and facilitate the loss of

valuable materiel. Therefore, there should be rigid control over concentration of supplies as to time and place during major operations. A temporary cutting off of less important parts of the front must be consciously carried out. Decision and responsibility must rest in any case with the unit commander.

Supply management must be continuously informed at what time and in what amounts the supplies directly important for combat have arrived with the field forces. No supply officer must be satisfied with the knowledge that these supplies have been allocated and shipped.

In strained situations, upon impending enemy penetrations, and during withdrawals, the responsible commander advisably orders the dividing of the supply base into a combat and a rear base. In the combat base only those supply installations should be accommodated that serve the direct combat supply; all others, particularly installations that are difficult to move, should be employed rearward of lines determined by the commanders.

The organization and the operational methods of the office of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration and of the offices of the chiefs of supply and administration of the field army headquarters proved to be of full value

throughout the war. The fact that general staff officers with good supply service records were repeatedly employed in this role, in which a great deal depends upon making manifold use of their experience, is significant. The same is true for the various specialist fields. An ideal solution lies in a systematic succession of an officer in positions with operations, supply, and frontline commitment; this, however, could be attained in only a few cases.

The changing conditions which developed in the course of the war and are different in each theater, necessarily caused organizational changes in the field of supply. The materiel situation has to be accorded to realize such necessities early and take care of them in sufficient time. Any organizational change that lags behind harbors the germ for a chain reaction of further changes and is apt to impair confidence in the commander. An increasing attention to the pulse of the front, an indefatigable exchange of views about it, and the specialist's anticipatory, creative ideas constitute the guarantee for a timely and proper change. Success lies in work and in the flexibility of mind, hence solely in personal values. Goliath was killed by David; and brute force has always been vanquished by the mind. So

it is in supply. He who knows how to breath life into sober figures and cold material is no longer the slave but the real master of matter. And this is the decisive point!

The serious supply difficulties, some of the catastrophes (Stalingrad), that arose in numerous cases were by no means derived from the existing organization and methods of the agencies dealt with in this treatise but rather from faulty high command decisions, transport conditions, climatic conditions, and material situation. Complete elimination of such difficulties in a war of long duration is well-nigh impossible.

If one, however, views the overall supply situation, it will be seen that it suffered throughout the war from the absence of a top-level superior.

Each branch of the Wehrmacht (Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe), each organization, and numerous anonymous agencies and posts anxiously guarded their supplies, procured, subject to control or, as in most cases, subject to no control, what they believed they had to have, and frustrated consequently all planning. Army supply was controlled by the Army High Command, otherwise, the overall supply picture must be recorded as having been complete chaos.

This picture became plain as early as the termination of the French campaign. In the staff of the then chief of supply and administration for France, a memorandum was prepared in the fall of 1940, demonstrating with the aid of examples the impossibility of getting anywhere with the duplication and confusion existing in supply. It culminated in the demand for an integration of all supply management in one top-level authority. A chief of supply and administration of the Wehrmacht was envisaged for this position. No attention was paid to the memorandum. At the end of the year 1942, a new memorandum was compiled in the staff of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration of the Army with the same end in view. It particularly pointed out innumerable examples, the preference accorded to the Luftwaffe, SS, Organisation Todt in contrast to the Army. Aside from fits of anger over its recommendations, it also receives no attention. Later on, when the overall situation regarding personnel and material became ever more menacing, it may perhaps have contributed to induce the Wehrmacht High Command to employ a special staff to ascertain the extent to which integration could be achieved. Political and personal reasons counteracted these endeavors. Toward the end of the war, a few measures in this direction were initiated, but the problem was never solved.

Any solution would have depended on the wartime top-level organization. If this organization would have recognized the fact that, on account of Germany's military-geographic situation, the land force, that is the Army, had to be accorded primacy and that Navy and Luftwaffe, rather than being ends in themselves, had to be subordinated to the Army for its support, the Army supply system could quite easily have been elevated to the plane of Wehrmacht supply. A Chief of Supply and Administration of the Wehrmacht would inevitably have resulted. His subordinate agents would then have been the chiefs of supply and administration of the various theaters of operations as the War Communications Zone Order, dated March 12, 1914, already provided. Such a solution would have been pliant enough to conform to the peculiarity of each theater and at the same time would have made possible a strict, systematic employment of supplies.

The necessary influence upon the Chief of Army Equipment and the analogous agencies of the Luftwaffe and the Navy could have been guaranteed by the Chief of Wehrmacht General Staff, and in accordance with his directives the Chief of the Army Supply and Administration of the Wehrmacht would have managed the overall supply. A decisive influence upon war production could likewise have been insured.

It is clear that such an organization calls for a particularly able and experienced personality and an appropriate circle of assistants. Whether it can be established during wartime appears doubtful. Its basic features must exist in peace if there is to be constructive and smooth efficiency in war. This assertion is illustrated by the history of the German Army supply during the war from 1939 to 1945.

/s/ Alfred TOPPE

Chart 1--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization Chart, 11 October 1916





Chart 1--Chief of Army Supply and Administration--continued



Remarks.

The Government General referred to in this chart comprised occupied Belgium in contrast to the Government General established in parts of Poland in World War II.

It will be noted that the use of Roman numerals and letters of the alphabet to designate staff branches and sections at Army High Command level differed from the standard use at other levels of command.

Chart 2--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization Chart, 8 October 1918




Chart 3--BRANCH 6, (SUPPLY BRANCH) ARMY GENERAL STAFF  
Organization in 1938




Chart 4--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization Chart, Fall 1939





Chart 4--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION--continued



Personnel employed in the Office of the Chief of Army Supply and Administration:

|                  |     |
|------------------|-----|
| Officers (CSC)   | 7   |
| Officers (other) | 26  |
| Officials        | 23  |
| NCO & Men        | 73  |
| Total            | 129 |

Chart 5--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

Organization Chart, Summer 1941

Chief of Army Sup &amp; Admin

Policy Sec  
(Chief: Capt GSC)  
Office com pers  
files; War Diary

Branch I  
(Chief: Lt Col, GSC)

Section 1

Sup planning w/Sec 3 & specl secs; Fld Army sup sitreps; Army sup orgn; Draft orders on basis of repts from Sec 3 & specl secs; Eval of sup repts; Dir Sec 3 & specl secs to eliminate rept difficulties; Sup trans w/Chief of Army Trans, ZI Overseas Staff, & AF Ln officer

Section 2

Orgn of sup trps in collaboration w/specs secs (rqsts for orgn changes or activation of sup units for fwd to Orgn Br, Army Gen Staff); Employ of GHQ sup trps according to recom of specl secs; Winter sup prep w/all specl secs; APO directories; Asgn of APO numbers; Trng; Regulations

Section 3

Planning, distr, & management of ammo, wpns & equip, mtr veh, & fuel sup; Rqn of above items from agencies of Office of Chief of Army Equip & Comd of Repl Army; Orgn of Fld Army mtr veh maint

Chief of Army Admin

Functions as in  
Chart # 4

Army Surgeon

Functions as in  
Chart # 4

Army

Veterinarian  
Functions as  
Chart # 4

Army Postmaster

Functions as in  
Chart # 4 (APO  
Directories  
w/Sec 4)

Chief ofRear Services

As in Chart # 4 & rcmd to Sec 2 employment of all GHQ sup trans space; Orgn of sup mtr veh maint w/Ch of Army Equip (Army equip specl now handled by Sec 3)

Chief ofTechnical Troops

Sec Chief simultaneously tech superior of all tech trps; Rcmd to Sec 2 employment of tech trps. Tech trps units contained specl pers for repair & maint of gas, water, power & other vital utility installations

Chart 5--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION--continued




Chart 6--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION

Staff Organization, Spring 1943




Chart 7--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization and Functions of Branch III, Spring 1943

Branch Chief

Section 3  
(Wpns & Equip)

Allocation to army groups of allotments from Ordnance Branch, Army General Staff;  
Shipment in coop with Ordnance Inspectorate (Chief of Army Equip), and with Sec 1;  
Assignment of Ordnance Depots;  
Requisitions to Ordnance Inspectors concerning assignment and functions of maint shops;  
Cooperation with Ordnance (Chief of Army Equip) in research to improve Ordnance materiel and in procurement of spare parts for Ordnance materiel;  
Cooperation with Army Chief Engr Officer and Sec IVa (Billeting) regarding uniform distr of tools from ZI

Ammunition  
Supply Section

Computation of ammo requirements for all theaters of operations;  
Info to staff of Chief of Army Equip, or Ordnance Office directly, on ammunition requirements  
Allocation of ammo to army groups;  
Cooperation with Staff III of Chief of Army Equip, Sec 1b of General Army Office, & Ordnance Inspectorate concerning ammo procurement;  
Ammo shipment in cooperation with Ordnance Sub-sec of Sec 3;  
Cooperation with AF Chief of Ordnance & Admin concerning AAA ammo and air trans


Section V (K)  
(Mtr Veh Sup)

Veh sup (excluding arm'd veh) to army groups;  
Coop w/Ordnance Branch of Army General Staff (planned distr of all veh available to Army) & w/Staff 1b or Ordnance Inspectorate 12 (proc & delivery of sup);  
Shipment thru Ordnance Sub-sec of Sec 3;  
Fuel sup according to allocations by Ordnance Branch of Wehrmacht Ordnance Staff and procurement by Ordnance Inspectorate 12 of Chief of Army Equip

Section V (J)  
(Mtr Veh Maint)


Computation of mtr veh spare parts & equip requirements;  
Rgn & shpmt in coop w/ Ordnance Center East  
Asst of Army Mtr Maint Serv units

Chart 8--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization Chart, 1945



The Motor Transportation Control Staff East was controlled directly by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff but was required to cooperate closely with supply and administration agencies.


Chart 8--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization Chart, 1945



The Motor Transportation Control Staff East was controlled directly by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff but was required to cooperate closely with supply and administration agencies.


Chart 8---OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION---continued

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On 11 Jul 44 all functions of Branch 2 were transferred to the Wehrmacht High Comd. A small skeleton staff was retained to answer inquiries and to wind up the affairs of the branch.

Chart 8---OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION---continued.



## Chart 9--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION SERVICES


## Chain of Command

## A. DURING CAMPAIGNS IN POLAND AND FRANCE, 1939-40.


Legend:

— Supply Matters

- - - Administration Matters



## B. DURING FIRST STAGES OF RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, 1941



## C. AFTER AUTUMN 1942




Chart 10--WORKING RELATIONS BETWEEN SECTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE  
CHIEF OF ARMY SUP & ADMIN AND THOSE OF OTHER OFFICES OF EQUAL STATUS





Chart 11--OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION  
Organization of a Field Agency in Russia

Remark.

Each Field Agency normally controlled one Supply District headed by a General Staff Corps Officer. If two or more districts existed they were spaced along the LOFC rearward from the Field Agency headquarters,

Chart 12--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN ARMY GROUP  
Staff Organization




Chart 13---ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH  
OF AN ARMY GROUP




Chart 13--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN ARMY GROUP---continued




Chart 13--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN ARMY GROUP--continued

Sup & Admin Officer

Section IVb  
(A Gp Med Off)

Care & evac of wounded;  
Rtn of convalescents  
from army gp hosp; Casu-  
alty rptg; Mil & civ  
health affairs; Tech  
supv med pers; Asg of  
med trps; Med sup;  
Med pers files

Controlled med units

Section IVc  
(A Gp Vet Off)

Asg of auth horses; Re-  
mount serv; Care & evac  
of sick & wounded horses;  
Mil & civ antiepidemic  
vet measures; Vet in-  
strument sup; Reg of  
captured & locally rqn  
horses; Asg & tech supv  
of vet trps & pers;  
Vet pers files

Controlled vet units

Section V  
(Mtr Trans Off)

Asg of auth mtr veh; Re-  
sup of mtr veh, mtr  
equip, parts, & tires;  
Mtr maint (incl use of  
civ workshops & cap-  
tured & locally rqn  
veh); Asg of mtr maint  
trps; Tech supv of mtr  
maint pers; Mtr maint  
pers files

Controlled mtr  
maint units

Section T  
(A Gp Technol Off)

Planning & const of  
sup installations;  
Power sup plants;  
Maint & opn of uti-  
lity installations;  
ZI & local proc of  
const mat; Coop w/  
Organization Todt;  
Asg of technol trps,  
Technol pers files

Controlled techno-  
logical units

A Gp Ordnance Inspector

Tech supv of all ord pers, ammo  
& ord depots, & ord repair shops  
within army group zone; Pers  
files of ord and ord maint pers

Controlled ordnance units

A Gp Economics Officer

Planning & control of economy in  
coop w/German civ & indigenous  
econ agencies; Exploit of in-  
digenous resources thru coord of  
mil & indigenous rqmts in coop w/  
East sections of Wehrmacht Arm  
Econ Off; Labor asg for mil  
purposes; Asg of econ detachments

Chart 13--SUPPLY AND ADMIN BRANCH OF AN ARMY GROUP--continued

Remarks.

The Weapons & Equipment and the Ammunition Sections originally had equal status under direct control by the 1st Deputy, receiving only technical directives through ordnance service channels. Ordnance units received technical directives from ordnance officers but otherwise were controlled by the commander of supply troops.

With the assignment of an ordnance inspector in 1943-44 these two sections were placed under dual control: In their supply management functions they continued to operate under the direction of the 1st Deputy; in personnel and technical matters they now came under the control of the ordnance inspector. The ordnance inspector also was responsible for the technical supervision of ammunition and ordnance materiel depots and for the employment of the ordnance troops directly assigned to the army group, and had command authority over these troops.

Initially Section T had handled construction in connection with billeting as a subsection of Section IVa. The actual construction had been carried out by GHQ construction units whereas electric power and water supply projects had been handled by independent technical battalions. In 1943 a separate Section T was formed and assumed responsibility for the activities hitherto handled by the former subsection of Section IVa. The chief of the new section was at the same time given command of all technological troops assigned to the army group so that he now was the tactical

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and technical superior of the technical battalions and of the former GHQ construction units, which were now redesignated surface construction companies.

Until 1943 the chief of Section V had only the status of a staff specialist. In 1943 he was placed in command of the army group motor maintenance units as both their tactical and technical superior.

In 1944 a new officer category, the "Officer in Specialized Services" was established. Former administrative officials were now designated "Officers in Specialized Services (Administration)" and former technical officers "Officers in Specialized Services (Motor Maintenance)." They were now given the normal status of a combat unit commander in their relations with the administrative and motor maintenance units, respectively, under their control.

Chart 14--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF AN ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Staff Organization




Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY





Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY--continued



Each section was required to prepare contributions to the branch war diary which, in turn was included as an annex with the army's war diary.

Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY--continued

Remarks.

The Weapons & Equipment and the Ammunition Sections originally had equal status under direct control by the 1st Deputy and received only technical instructions through ordnance channels. The ordnance troops were assigned to the commander of supply troops and received only technical instructions from the chiefs of the above two sections.

With the establishment of an ordnance inspector at army group headquarters early in 1943 - 44 the senior ordnance officer on the army headquarters staff was placed in control of the Weapons & Equipment Branch and given command authority over all ordnance personnel assigned to the army. As a member of the army headquarters staff, the chief of the Weapons & Equipment Section was now directly subordinate to the chief of staff and received his tactical instructions through the supply and administration officer. In technical and personnel matters he was subordinate to the ordnance inspector at army group headquarters.

Changes in the position of Section T at army level were similar to those described for army group in chart 13. It remains to be said that if an army had no assigned technical battalions or companies these units were requested from army group or from the Chief of Army Supply and Administration whenever required, and that when an army had an assigned technical battalion, the battalion commander frequently performed the functions of a chief of the technological section.

Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY--continued

Initially the chief of Section V had only technical responsibilities within the army headquarters. In 1943 he was placed in command of the army's assigned motor transport units and as such had full command authority over all assigned motor transport and maintenance troops.

The chief of the Economics Section served simultaneously as the economics officer of the army concerned. The section was first established during the Russian Campaign. Until then economics had been handled by a subsection of the Administration Section (Section IVa). In view of the increased importance attached to the military handling of economic affairs in the eastern theater, an Economic Staff East was created at Wehrmacht High Command level and an economics officer appointed at army group level. The Economics Section was controlled by these two agencies and in turn exercised full control over the economic staffs and detachments operating within the zone of its army. Measures taken late in the war to simplify matters and economize in personnel included the reorganization of the economics staffs as economics sections assigned to the supply and administration officer of the army concerned. However, it was too late for the effects of this reorganization to become noticeable.

The changed status of administrative and technological officials in 1944 has been described in chart 13.

Initially all installations such as equipment depots, ordnance workshops, and ammunition administration staffs were under the command of the

Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY--continued

commander of supply troops. With the introduction of a senior ordnance officer (the chief of the Weapons and Equipment Section), these installations and all ordnance troops assigned to the army were placed under his direct command. Only the engineer equipment maintenance battalion, usually employed with the ordnance depot, remained assigned to the commander of supply troops. In many instances, however, the armies were no longer assigned an engineer equipment maintenance battalion.

Prisoner of war administration units at army level were originally treated as service troops assigned to the army and were controlled through the 1st Deputy Supply and Administration Officer. After the establishment of a commander of prisoner of war administration units at army group level in 1943 - 44 they were placed under his command. In consultation with the responsible personnel at army level he regulated their employment and assigned the necessary units to the army whenever required. Late in the war, just prior to the time when Germany itself became a theater of operations, the post was abolished and the responsibility for prisoner of war affairs was transferred to the prisoner of war organization under the Commander of the Replacement Army and Chief of Army Equipment. From then on units were again assigned to armies as required and were treated as assigned service units.

Further changes in respect to the supply and other service units at army level resulted from the revision of tables of organization and equipment to economize in personnel and materiel, particularly in vehicles.

Chart 15--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A FIELD ARMY--continued

In the fall of 1944 an effort was made to consolidate the service troops at army level in battalions and regiments similar to the way in which divisional service troops had been organized in service regiments. At army level the service units thus formed were to be placed under the command of the army supply troops commander, who was given the command authority and status of a brigade commander. The purpose was to simplify the chain of command, obtain firmer control, and obtain uniform training in military subjects.

However, being only of an experimental nature, the measure was not introduced uniformly by all armies and no specific order prescribing a uniform arrangement for all army headquarters was issued during the war.

## Chart 16--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A DIVISION

## Sup &amp; Admin Officer

Asst Sup & Admin Officer

Sup mgmt; Intrpr of  
sup sit; Rqn &  
repts; Instr to  
Div sup trps comd;  
Spec orders to  
sup trps; Tac & sup  
maps; War Diary

Ammo & Gas Defense Officer

Ammo sup; Rtn of  
empties; Rcn for  
ammo dump sites;  
Daily ammo stock  
rept for corps  
hq, if necessary  
to incl rqst to  
Div sup trps comd  
for trans & labor;  
Gas def & equip

Weapons & Equip Officer

Initial auth issue &  
resup of wpns &  
equip (incl arty &  
engr equip); Evac  
of damaged equip;  
Wpn & equip maint;  
Control & use of  
captured mat; Es-  
tablishment of col  
points for equip &  
captured mat; Tech  
supv of ord pers;

Fuel Officer

Initial auth issue;  
Rqn & resup; Employ  
& mis asg to fuel  
dist points; Use of  
captured fuel


Economics Officer

Econ sitreps concerning  
agriculture, food, com-  
merce, forestry, timber;  
Econ planning & dir;  
Coord of mil & civ  
rqmts; Employ & exploit  
of indigenous labor  
& resources

Field Postmaster

Opn of field post office;  
Establishment of field  
post receiving & distrib-  
uting points; APO sur-  
veys; APO number direc-  
tories; Postal restric-  
tions; Tech supv  
of APO pers

Chart 16--SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION BRANCH OF A DIVISION--continued

Remarks.

Signal supplies were handled by the division signal officer, engineer supplies by the division engineer officer, in close cooperation with the supply and administration officer. Each of the above sections was required to furnish contributions or annexes for inclusion in the war diary of the supply and administration branch, which, in turn, was included as an annex to the division war diary.

Chart 17--ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONAL SERVICE UNITS

A. INFANTRY DIVISION

Administrative Troops

- 1 Butchery Plat (mtz)
- 1 Bakery Plat (mtz)
- 1 Rat Admin Co

Veterinary Svc

- 1 Veterinary Co

Postal Svc

- 1 Fld Post Office (mtz)

Police Services

- 1 Mtz MP Detachment

Comd of Div Sup Troops

- 1 Supply Company
- 1 Mtr Maint Plat (mtz)
- 1 Light Mtr Fuel Trans Column (mtz)
- 3 Mtz Trans Columns
- 3 Horse-Drawn Trans Columns

Medical Services

- 1 Fld Hospital (usually detached)
- 2 Mtz Amb Plat
- 1 Medical Company
- 1 Mtz Medical Company

---

B. ARMORED DIVISION

Administrative Troops

- 1 Butchery Plat (mtz)
- 1 Bakery Plat (mtz)
- 1 Rat Admin Co (mtz)

Motor Maint Services

- 1 Spare Parts Company (mtz)
- 3 Repair Shop Companies (mtz)

Postal Services

- 1 Fld Post Office (mtz)

Comd of Div Sup Troops

- 1 Supply Company (mtz)
- 1 Repair Shop Company (mtz)
- 1 Hvy Mtr Fuel Trans Column (mtz)
- 4 Hvy Trans Columns (mtz)

Medical Services

- 2 Mtz Ambulance Platoons
- 2 Mtz Medical Companies


Police Services

- 1 Mtz MP Detachment



## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Special Supplies

Remarks:

Requisitions for air force items of equipment or weapons were forwarded by Army High Command to Luftwaffe High Command, which authorized shipment by Luftwaffe ordnance depots.  
 Air transportation could be authorized by army or army group headquarters. Corps and general headquarters units requisitioned directly through the appropriate army headquarters.  
 Each month Army High Command equipment parks were ordered to submit stock reports in form of requisitions.

Legend:

-----: Requisitions  
 .....: Authorization to ship  
 \_\_\_\_\_: Supply Channels






## REPORT, REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Ammunition Reports

| <u>Type of Report</u>       | <u>Reporting Agency</u>       | <u>Report Interval</u>       | <u>Particulars Shown</u>                                                             |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ammunition expended         | Field Units                   | Daily                        | Total number of rounds; breakdown by categories                                      |
|                             | Division                      | Daily                        | Total in tons; breakdown by main categories                                          |
|                             | Corps                         | Daily                        | As above                                                                             |
|                             | Army                          | Daily                        | Total in tons                                                                        |
|                             | Army Group                    | 5-Day                        | Total in tons; breakdown by main categories                                          |
| Ammunition stocks available |                               | Daily                        | Total in tons                                                                        |
|                             | Field Units                   | 10-Day                       | Percent of auth basic issue by type and rounds                                       |
|                             |                               | 5-Day                        | Number of AT guns and rounds                                                         |
|                             |                               | 10-Day                       | Total percent of auth basic issue                                                    |
|                             | Division                      | 10-Day                       | By type and rounds                                                                   |
|                             |                               | 5-Day                        | AT guns and rounds                                                                   |
|                             |                               | Daily                        | Total percent of auth basic issue                                                    |
|                             | Corps                         | 10-Day                       | By type and rounds                                                                   |
|                             |                               | 5-Day                        | AT guns and rounds                                                                   |
|                             | Army                          | Same as corps                | Same as corps                                                                        |
| Ammunition requisitions     |                               | Daily                        | Stocks held and shipments to field units, in tons and broken down by main categories |
|                             | Field units, Division & Corps | As ordered by next higher hq |                                                                                      |
|                             | Army                          | 10-Day                       | By rounds and main categories                                                        |
|                             | Army Group                    | Monthly                      | By rounds and main categories                                                        |
| Shipments                   |                               | Daily                        | By tons and breakdown by main categories and rounds                                  |
|                             | Army Group                    |                              |                                                                                      |

MOTOR VEHICLE FLOW CHART


### 1. Supply of New Vehicles.



Legend.

- Requisitions  
 ----- Authority to ship  
 ----- Flow of supplies

## 2. Vehicle Evacuation, Repair, and Return.



Legend.


- Repair requests
- Repair authorization
- Movement of vehicles

## Remarks.

Vehicles beyond repair by division or corps maintenance facilities were forwarded through army to ZI. Transportation from army level up by rail or road.

## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Human and Animal Rations

Legend.

Requisitions

Supply authorization


Flow of supplies

Remarks.

Requisitions were submitted by each unit to the administrative section of the next higher headquarters for all items not locally procurable.  
 Road transportation from army group to army was handled by army & army group units, from army to division by army and division units.  
 Transportation from division distribution point was by vehicles of the field units.

## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Clothing &amp; Personal Equipment

Legend.

Requisitions

Supply authorization

Flow of supplies

Remarks.

Limited stocks were held in army and army group depots to meet urgent requirements.  
 Transportation from distribution point of division administrative company by receiving unit vehicles.








# REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Horses




**Legend.**

### Requisitions Shipment authorization Movement of horses

Remarks.


It was mandatory for all captured and stray horses to be turned in to a veterinary company. Captured and stray horses were returned by army to division remount depot (thru division remount detachment when one was attached to the division veterinary company) after treatment. Except where otherwise stated, movement was on hoof.



**Legend.**

Requisitions  
Shipment  
authorization  
Supply move-  
ments

## Sick and Injured Horses



**Legend.**

# Reports Movement of horses


1. On hoof or horse-drawn transportation
2. as 1 or Vet Co mtr vccls
3. Vet Co or other mtr vccls

## Remarks.

Each echelon reported to the next higher echelon the number of horses under treatment in its installations and recommended the employment of veterinary companies and means of transportation. For movement of convalescent horses to the field see chart 28.

## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

Fortification, Obstacle, and Road Construction Equipment,  
Machinery, and Materials (Including Concrete) for use by  
Troops in the Field




Remarks.

Requisitions  
Shipment  
authorization  
Movement of  
supplies

**Legend.**

Concrete, roadbuilding materials, and machinery were requisitioned thru the OT Director of Works attached to the army group (OT-Organization Todd, a paramilitary construction organization of the National Socialist Party, auxiliary to the armed forces). At army group requisitions were handled by the assigned army group engineer officer or by the attached inspector of national fortifications; at Army High Command level by the Army Chief Fortifications Engineer Officer.

REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART  
Signal Instruments and Material for Use by Troops  
in the Field

Legend.

Requisitions

Shipment

authorization

Movement of

supplies


Remarks.

At Army High Command level requisitions were forwarded by the Army Chief Signal Officer to the Signal Group in the Office of the Commander of the Replacement Army.

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## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

Fortification Construction Machinery and Equipment, Temporary Bridge Construction Materials, General Machinery, and Combat Materiel for Unit Engineers

Legend.

Requisitions

Shipment

authorization


Flow of

supplies

MS # P-041q

## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

## Billet Construction Materials

Legend.


Requisitions  
Shipment  
authorization  
Flow of  
supplies

Remarks.

The Organisation Todt (OT) was a paramilitary construction organization of the National Socialist Party, auxiliary to the armed forces. A director of works was attached to each army group headquarters.  
At Army High Command level requisitions were handled by the Army Chief Technical Troops Officer.

## REQUISITION AND SUPPLY FLOW CHART

Special Equipment, Tools, Machinery, and Construction  
Materials for Technical Troops in the Field



Legend.

Requisitions  
---  
Shipment  
---  
authorization  
---  
Movement of  
supplies  
---

Remarks.


At Army High Command level requisitions were forwarded by the Army Chief Technical Troops Officer to the Technical Troops Inspectorate in the Office of the Commander of the Replacement Army.

## ARMY POSTAL SERVICE MAIL FLOW CHART

Federal Post and  
Telegraph ServiceArmy Postal Service.

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PERSONNEL FLOW CHART  
Evacuation of Prisoners of War

Legend.

----- Reports  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Movement of  
 \_\_\_\_\_ prisoners

Remarks.

Each echelon reported to the next higher echelon the total number of prisoners captured.  
 Until PWs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Replacement Army in the ZI, their management and movement were a responsibility of the Army Chief of Supply and Administration at Army High Command.  
 At division level guard details were drawn from MP or combat units; at army level from special guard or from line of communications units.